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Abstract
We analyze how political discretion affects the selection of government workers, using
individual-level data on political party membership and matched employer-employee
data on the universe of formal workers in Brazil. Exploiting close mayoral races, we
find that winning an election leads to an increase of over 40% in the number of members
of the winning party working in the municipal bureaucracy. Employment of members
of the ruling party increases relatively more in senior positions, but also expands in
lower-ranked jobs, suggesting that discretionary appointments are used both to influ-
ence policymaking and to reward supporters. We find that party members hired af-
ter their party is elected tend be of similar or even higher quality than members of
the runner-up party, contrary to common perceptions that political appointees are less
qualified. Moreover, the increased public employment of members of the ruling party is
long-lasting, extending beyond the end of the mayoral term.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze whether political office holders allocate public sector jobs to members
of their own political party and how this affects the selection of government workers, using
detailed individual-level data on almost 15 million political party members and matched
employer-employee data on the universe of formal workers in Brazil. We exploit close mayoral
elections to identify the causal effect of being the party in power on the employment of party
members in the public sector and also analyze (i) whether this effect differs across occupations
in the bureaucracy and (ii) how this affects the characteristics of the workers hired. Moreover,
we also study whether the public employment of members of the ruling party is tied to the
party’s continued electoral success.
Public sector employment is a valuable resource for the party in power (Pollock 1937;
Reid and Kurth 1989; Folke, Hirano and Snyder 2011). Government jobs can be used as a
patronage tool, that is, to reward supporters for their votes and/or campaign efforts (Calvo
and Murillo 2004; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2009).1 From this perspective, public
sector employment can be a mechanism for establishing loyal clienteles and constitutes one of
many vote buying or clientelistic strategies available to politicians (Mainwaring 1999; Stokes
et al. 2013; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter 2014).2 The ability to appoint party loyalists
to public sector positions can also help build and maintain the infrastructure required for
political parties to function, as government jobs can be used to compensate party members
for their work (Sorauf 1964; Conway and Feigert 1968; Panebianco 1988). Public employment
can also be used to maintain party cohesion, by rewarding loyal party officials with jobs or
titles and distributing positions in the bureaucracy among the different factions that make up
a party (Wilson 1961; Sorauf 1960; Muller 1989). Political parties might also use government
jobs as source of fund-raising, by requiring appointees to contribute part of their salaries to
the party (Key 1964; Ware 1996).3 Finally, parties can grant jobs in the bureaucracy to their
1Patronage can be defined as “the proffering of public resources (most typically, public employment) by
office holders in return for electoral support” (Stokes 2009).
2A key difference between patronage and other clientelistic or vote buying strategies is that it implies
the distribution of state resources and therefore can only be conducted by the party in power (Medina
and Stokes 2007). Theoretical arguments suggest that public sector employment is an attractive tool for
patronage, compared to other forms of redistributing public resources towards supporters, because jobs are
easily targeted (Persson and Tabellini 1999; Lizzeri and Persico 2001), can conceal the extent of redistribution
(Coate and Morris 1995) and can help overcome political commitment problems (Robinson and Verdier 2013).
3For instance, according to Freedman (1994) in the Chicago machine in the middle of the 20th century,
“Job holders also had to buy tickets to various party fundraising events and were required to contribute a
percentage of their salaries to the ward organization. Generally, they were assessed between 2% and 3% of
their total pay.” In the case of Brazil that we analyze in this paper, most political parties require members
members as a way of influencing policy-making and establishing a party presence within the
state (Peters and Pierre 2004; Jalali and Lisi 2009; Kopecky`, Mair and Spirova 2012).
The extent to which the party in power can use public employment for its own benefit
depends, crucially, on the degree to which political office holders have discretion over person-
nel decisions in the bureaucracy. Although most countries have introduced professional civil
services, in practice all bureaucracies combine civil servants and discretionary appointees.4
The seminal works by Wilson (1887) and Weber (1922) argue that, to ensure a competent
and efficient public administration, political discretion should be curtailed. Instead, public
workers should be largely insulated from political pressures through the establishment of a
professional civil service, with workers hired, promoted, and fired on the basis of merit. Con-
sistent with these arguments, empirical evidence shows that merit-based career civil services
are associated with higher economic growth, lower corruption, and better bureaucratic per-
formance (Rauch 1995; Evans and Rauch 1999; Rauch and Evans 2000; Dahlström, Lapuente
and Teorell 2012; Ornaghi 2016) and that discretionally appointed officials tend to perform
worse (Gilmour and Lewis 2006; Lewis 2007; Xu 2017).
On the other hand, despite the advantages of merit-based civil services, political control
over personnel decisions could have several benefits. Discretion over appointments could im-
prove selection, if politicians have private information about appointees, and might also limit
agency problems, as loyal subordinates may be more motivated. Partisan appointments can
also help elected officials control the policy-making process, making the bureaucracy more
responsive to the priorities of political leadership and facilitating the implementation of po-
litical decisions (Moe 1985; Pierre and Peters 2005; Lewis 2010). Moreover, as emphasised by
Grindle (2012), political discretion over hiring decisions does not necessarily imply that ap-
pointees are chosen without regard to competence. Electoral accountability should motivate
politicians to choose bureaucrats who can perform their jobs effectively.
Identifying the extent to which elected officials allocate jobs in the pubic sector to their
supporters and how this affects the selection of government workers presents significant chal-
lenges. First, the extent of partisan appointments in the bureaucracy is not easily observable.5
who are appointed to senior positions in the public sector to contribute part of their salaries to the party.
4Discretionary appointments tend to focus on the highest positions in the administration, but in many
countries also extend to mid- and lower-level positions in the bureaucracy. According to expert survey data
from Dahlberg et al. (2013), in more than 60% of non-OECD countries, political criteria take precedence over
merit criteria in public sector appointments.
5Most empirical studies rely on expert surveys of the degree to which political or meritocratic reasons
drive government hiring (Dahlberg et al. 2013; Kitschelt 2014; Kopecky` et al. 2016) or use proxy measures,
such as total public sector employment or personnel expenditures (Calvo and Murillo 2004; O’Dwyer 2006;
Grzymala-Busse 2007; Remmer 2007).
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Accurately identifying whether politicians favor their supporters when hiring, would require
individual level data on both public sector employment and political preferences, which are
seldom available. Second, even if these data were available, identifying the causal effect of
being the party in power on the employment of political supporters is difficult, as political
preferences are likely to be correlated with both public sector employment and electoral out-
comes. For instance, political parties whose members have a higher ability to work in the
public sector might have more government employees and also might be more likely to get
elected.
In this paper, we address these empirical challenges by analyzing whether Brazilian mayors
allocate jobs in the municipal bureaucracy to members of their own political party, using
detailed individual-level data on political party membership and employment. We analyse
political party members because party membership has been typically considered the main
criterion for selecting political appointees, as it signals loyalty and assures politicians that
appointees will be aligned with their policy priorities (Pierre and Peters 2005; Manow and
Wettengel 2006). We focus on formal party membership, which differs from party voting or
party loyalty, as it is a formal status that the individual must actively acquire by signing up
with the political party and fulfilling any obligations set by the party bylaws (Scarrow 2017).6
As discussed above, political parties may target jobs to their members not only to reward
them for their support, but also as an instrument to strengthen the party organization and
to control state institutions. We use data on all municipal public sector employees, which
allows us to analyze the aggregate effects of discretionary hirings of party members on the
municipal bureaucracy and also to explore any differences across occupational categories. To
estimate the causal effect of being the party in office on the public employment of members
of the winning party, we use a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) in close races within
municipality. In particular, for a given municipality and mayoral term, we compare the
aggregate employment in the municipal public sector of members of the party that barely won
an election with that of members of the party that barely lost the election (i.e., the runner-
up party). The intuition for this identification strategy is that, within a given municipality,
parties that lost an election by a narrow margin can be a good counterfactual for parties that
won that same election by a narrow margin.
Our results using an RRD in close races within municipality show that winning a mayoral
6In Brazil, party membership is a formal status within the party’s organization. To become a member,
individuals must go to the local party office to voluntarily sign up with the party. Every party has its own
membership rules. In some cases there are selective process and supporters are required to pay annual dues.
The law requires legally recognised parties to have a minimum number of members and parties must keep a
register of their members.
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election has a positive and significant effect on the employment of members of the winning
party in the municipal bureaucracy. In particular, we find that the number of members
of the winning party employed by the municipal public sector in a given municipality and
mayoral term is around 35% to 41% higher than the same figure for members of the runner-up
party. This represents an increase in the fraction of total municipal public sector employees
accounted for by members of the winning party of between 2 and 2.5 percentage points
(relative to members of the runner-up party).7 We also find that our results are mostly
driven by hiring of members of the ruling party and not by a reduction in the employment of
supporters of the runner-up candidate, indicating that mayors use their discretionary powers
to grant jobs to members of their party.
We also analyze whether the effect of winning office differs across occupational categories
in the municipal bureaucracy. We find that winning a mayoral election has a positive and
significant effect on the employment of members of the winning party across all occupations.
This effect is larger (in relative terms) for senior officials and managers, suggesting that the
need to make the bureaucracy sensitive to the preferences of elected leaders is an important
driver of discretionary hiring. However, we also find large increases the number of members
of the winning party in non-senior positions in the bureaucracy, suggesting that patronage
or other partisan reasons also play an important role in hiring decisions.
To analyze whether the use of political discretion affects the quality of workers hired by
the municipal bureaucracy, we study several characteristics of those workers hired from the
private sector: education, private sector wage, and private sector wage residual, estimated
from a Mincerian equation defined over a large set of individual characteristics, following
the approach of Besley et al. (2017). We take all these characteristics in the year before the
workers join the municipal bureaucracy. We find that, contrary to the common perception
that discretionary appointments lead to the selection of unqualified appointees, the quality of
members of the winning party hired after the party takes office is similar to that of members
of the runner-up party for most occupations, except for senior officials and managers. For
these senior positions, we actually find that members of the winning party tend to have higher
private sector wages and wage residuals, suggesting that politicians might be able to use their
7Our results could reflect party switching, if individuals who already had public sector jobs become
members of the ruling party (or quit the runner-up party) after the elections. To address this concern, we
estimated all our regressions considering individuals’ political party membership in the electoral year and
maintaining it constant over the whole mayoral term to avoid capturing any changes in party membership
that occurred after the elections, and obtained results similar to those reported throughout the paper. These
results are reported in Appendix Table A.9
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discretionary powers to appoint higher quality party members to these positions.8 This is
consistent with the findings of Iyer and Mani (2012) that politicians value both loyalty and
expertise when appointing bureaucrats.
Finally, we exploit the time series dimension of our data, extending our RDD in close races
within municipality to a difference-in-difference framework, using annual data. We find that
winning a mayoral election leads to a significant increase in the employment of members of
the winning party in the municipal public sector, and that a large part of this increase occurs
in the first year of the term. We also find that the public employment of party members is tied
to their parties’ subsequent electoral success: the number of members of the winning party
employed in the municipal bureaucracy remains stable if the party is re-elected at the end of
the mayoral term, but decreases significantly if the party does not stay in power. However,
even when parties leave office, we find evidence of long-lasting increases in the employment
of members of the winning party for jobs in non-senior positions. This pattern is consistent
with the idea that senior officials and managers help align bureaucrat’s actions with the
interests of elected politicians and, as a result, employment in these positions is directly tied
to specific politicians. However, it runs contrary to the idea that parties might use permanent
appointments in senior positions to try to continue influencing policy after leaving office. Our
findings suggests that mayors are able to grant permanent jobs to members of their parties in
lower-ranked positions, which is more likely to reflect the objective of rewarding or motivating
supporters.
This paper contributes to a large body of research in both political science and economics,
described above, that analyzes how political office holders use government jobs in a discre-
tionary manner to achieve political objectives, such rewarding electoral support, strengthen-
ing the party organization, and influencing policy-making.9 We contribute to this literature
by estimating the causal effect of winning office on the employment of members of the ruling
party, providing rigorous evidence on the extent to which elected officials use discretionary
appointments to favor their own party members. Moreover, we present evidence on the pos-
sible motivations for this, exploiting differences across occupations within the bureaucracy,
and also analyze its impact on the quality of workers hired by the public sector. This paper
8A potential concern about these results is that high quality members of the opposition party might be
less willing to join the bureaucracy, and as a result only lower quality members of the runner-up party may
be included in our analysis. This would lead us to overestimate the effect of winning office on the quality of
members of the winning party. To address this concern, we compared the characteristics of members of the
runner-up party hired from the private sector in the three years before the start of the mayoral term and
in the following four years (e.g., the whole duration of the mayoral term). We found no significant change,
suggesting that a reduction in the quality of members of the runner-up party does not account for our results.
9See Stokes (2009), Kitschelt andWilkinson (2007), and Kopecky` et al. (2016) for reviews of this literature.
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is also related to a more recent literature in economics which studies the personnel economics
of the state, analyzing how selection, incentives, and management practices affect the perfor-
mance of bureaucrats (see, for instance, Dal Bó, Finan and Rossi 2013; Ashraf, Bandiera and
Jack 2014; Khan, Khwaja and Olken 2016; Rasul and Rogger 2017). Finally, this paper is
related to the literature on the value of political connections for firms (Fisman 2001; Faccio
2006; Cingano and Pinotti 2013; Acemoglu et al. 2016) and individuals (Vidal, Draca and
Fons-Rosen 2012; Markussen and Tarp 2014; Gagliarducci and Manacorda 2017; Fafchamps
and Labonne 2017). In a contemporaneous paper, Colonnelli, Prem and Teso (2017) analyze
the value of political connections for individuals in Brazil, focusing on campaign donors and
non-elected candidates for city councillors, and find that being connected to the party in
power increases the probability of being employed in the public sector, consistent with our
findings. Different from them, we do not focus on the value of connections from the per-
spective of the politically-connected individuals, but rather analyze the aggregate effects of
discretionary hirings of party members, allowing us to provide a more complete picture of
how this affects the municipal public sector as a whole. Moreover, while they conclude that
patronage is a major driver of hiring, our results suggest that mayors use discretionary ap-
pointments for a variety of reasons, and not only as a patronage tool, and that they appoint
high quality party members to senior positions. These differences might be explained by the
fact we focus on the universe of party members and, as discussed above, there are several
reasons why the party in power may grant public employment to its members.
2 Institutional Setting
We study mayoral elections in Brazil to analyze the effect of electoral success on the em-
ployment of political party members in the public sector. This section provides background
information on Brazilian municipalities and on how public sector workers are hired. It also
describes political parties in Brazil and the role of party members.
2.1 Brazilian Municipalities
Brazilian politics takes place in the framework of a federal presidential representative democ-
racy. The layers of political and administrative organization in Brazil are the federal govern-
ment, 26 states and one federal district (Brasilia), and 5,567 municipalities.
Municipalities are minor federative units with an autonomous local government, com-
prised of a mayor (Prefeito) and a city council (Camara dos Vereadores), both of which are
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directly elected by voters every four years. Mayors of municipalities with less than 200,000
voters are elected with plurality rule, while mayors of municipalities above this threshold are
elected with (run-off) majority rule.10 Municipal elections are held every four years and take
place at the same time for all municipalities across the country.11 Elections are usually held
in October, with the oath of office taking place in January of the following year. Before 1998
Brazilian mayors could not run for reelection, but since then mayors are allowed to run for a
second term.
Municipalities are responsible for the provision of key public goods and services, including
public transportation, early childhood and primary education, sanitation, and health services.
Municipalities are required by law to spend a minimum fraction of their total income on health
and education. Although municipalities can collect local taxes, most municipalities rely on
state and federal transfers as their main revenue sources, with these transfers accounting for
over 90 percent of the municipal budget on average (Gardner 2013).
Given the high decentralization in the provision of public goods, municipal public sector
workers account for a large fraction of total public sector employees. Municipal employment
has increased over the last decades, from about 39% of total public sector employment in 1995
to about 56% in 2013 (the last year in our sample), reflecting the increasing decentralization
in the provision of public services and the creation of new municipalities over this period
(de Mattos 2011).
2.2 Political Parties and Party Members in Brazil
Federal laws and the Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, TSE ) regulate
political parties in Brazil. The Constitution establishes that all political parties must be na-
tional, banning local parties. Parties must have a minimum number of members, equivalent
to 0.5% of the votes cast in the previous national elections for Congress, to be legally recog-
nized. Parties are required by law to have their own statutes, describing their organizational
structure, the process for selecting candidates, and the rights and duties of party members.
Independent candidates are not allowed; candidates must be members of a party to run for
any public office.12
10In the 2004 and 2008 mayoral elections that we analyze, only 68 and 77 municipalities, respectively,
were above this threshold and thus could potentially go to a second round.
11Elections for President, governors, and state and federal legislators all take place at the same time every
four years, while municipal elections are staggered by two years, so they do not coincide with any other
elections.
12See Albarracín (2015) for a more detailed description of the laws and regulations governing the Brazilian
party system.
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Every individual who is eligible to vote can become a political party member. 13 Party
membership is a formal status within the party’s organization and requires an individual’s
active decision. To become a member, individuals must go to the local party office to volun-
tarily sign up with the party. Online member registration is not allowed. Every party has
its own membership rules. In some cases there are calendars for registration and selective
processes. The statute of the party defines the rights and duties of its members. In general,
party members are required to attend party meetings and activities related to the political
campaigns of party candidates, provide support in electoral campaigns, participate in fund
raising activities, and vote for political candidates of the party. Some parties also require
members to pay dues.14
The law allows parties to present a common candidate list for any office, pooling their
votes. Each electoral coalition is built for a specific electoral dispute, not implying in any
programmatic agreement between the parties involved or the formation of a government
coalition after the election. Parties can only be part of one coalition in a given municipality
for local elections, although the same party can form different electoral coalitions in different
municipalities. In practice, it is uncommon for parties in mayoral elections to remain outside
an electoral coalition, and coalitions are considered the unit of electoral competition at the
local level (Andrews 2015).
There are currently 35 officially registered political parties in Brazil, but only four major
parties. PMDB (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro) is the largest party measured
by the number of members and mayoral offices held.15 The party has been described as a
“catch-all” party (Mainwaring 1999), as its low level of ideological commitment allows it to
attract many different types of voters. The party is a strong competitor in local elections in
almost all regions of the country, even if very few Brazilians claim to identify with it. Because
of its relevance, PMDB is usually part of the legislative coalition supporting the President.
PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) was founded in 1980 by labor unionists and intellectuals and
distinguished itself from other parties for its left-progressive party program. PT governed
at the federal level from 2003 to 2016 and became the largest party in Congress. PSDB
(Partido da Social-Democracia Brasileira) occupied the presidency in 1994 and 1998 under
13Voting and registration are mandatory for all literate citizens aged 18 to 70. Party membership is
completely independent from voting registration.
14For instance, according to the statute of the PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores), party members who do
not hold a public sector job should donate every semester an amount equivalent to 3-6% of their monthly
wage, depending on income levels. Party members that that are appointed to senior public sector positions
are required to donate between 6-20% of monthly wages every six months.
15Appendix Table A.1 shows the distribution of party members across parties for each of the electoral
years in our sample (2004, 2008, and 2012).
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the leadership of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and has been the main opposition party during
the PT administration. DEM (Democratas) is considered the main right-wing party, and was
PSDB’s most important coalition partner during the Cardoso administration.
There is significant debate about the importance of parties in the Brazilian political sys-
tem. Brazil has been generally considered to have a weakly institutionalized party system,
with high electoral volatility, relatively low levels of party identification among the elec-
torate, high fragmentation, and lack of strong ideological platforms (Ames 2009; Ames and
Power 2007; Mainwaring 1999; Kinzo 2003; Desposato 2006). However, some authors have
highlighted the importance of party leaders in the legislative decision-making process at the
federal level (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000). Moreover, following the party line in legisla-
tive votes helps legislators obtain valuable resources, like pork-barrel and government jobs.
(Pereira and Mueller 2003; Alston 2005; Zucco Jr 2009; Barberia and Praça 2014).
There is a strong link between pork and patronage at the federal and local levels. Mem-
bers of Congress use mayoral candidates as their local brokers to advertise pork in a given
municipality during their electoral campaigns. Most municipalities in Brazil are small (the
median municipality had about 8,500 registered voters in 2013), and this allows mayoral
candidates to build encompassing patronage machines in their districts. Mayoral candidates
have extensive knowledge of their area and constituents, and continued interaction allows
them to gather information from voters and gain their trust. In most cases, they recruit
party members, including council candidates, municipal bureaucrats, and professional bro-
kers, who devote part of their time to helping politicians in exchange for jobs, gifts, and
favors (Krauss and Pekkanen 2011; Montero 2012; Novaes 2017). There are incentives for
party elites at the local level to invest in party organization, as politicians make extensive
use of the party organization in local elections (Van Dyck 2014; Samuels and Zucco 2015).
2.3 Civil Service in Brazil
Brazil was the first country in Latin America to establish a formal merit-based career public
bureaucracy, and its civil service is considered one of the region’s most extensive and pro-
fessional (Longo and Iacoviello 2010; Grindle 2012; Cortázar Velarde et al. 2014). Brazil’s
five constitutions since 1934 have all included commitments to a merit-based professional
bureaucracy.16
Civil servants must undertake a formal, competitive, open entrance examination, whose
16See Geddes (1996), Gaetani and Heredia (2002), and Grindle (2012) for analyses of the historical evolu-
tion of the civil service in Brazil.
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requirements are job-specific and can include written and oral tests, as well as the submission
of academic and professional credentials. Civil servants are granted tenure after three years
on the job. Municipalities have autonomy to create and modify civil service positions in
the municipal bureaucracy. Each municipality has its own Position, Career, and Wage Plan
(Plano de Cargos, Carreiras e Salários), describing the different positions in the municipal
bureaucracy and the required qualifications for the job. About 73% of municipal public
sector workers were career civil servants in 2013 (IBGE 2014). Anecdotal evidence suggests
that the results of civil service examinations are manipulated in some cases at the local level,
although it is not clear how common manipulation actually is.17 Even without explicitly
manipulating examinations, mayors could favor members of their parties by, among similarly
qualified applicants, hiring those that are politically aligned with them.
Municipalities can also hire workers for some positions that are exempt from civil service
entrance examinations. First, mayors can directly appoint workers for senior positions, such
as manager, supervisor, and advisor.18 Mayors have ample discretion in hiring and firing for
these positions, which are not part of the career civil service and do not require a competitive
hiring process. These positions accounted for more than 8% of total municipal public sector
workers in 2013.19 Anecdotal evidence suggests that mayors might be able to use these
discretionary appointments to hire workers for lower-level jobs that should be occupied by
career civil servants.20
Second, municipalities can hire workers under temporary contracts, for a period of six
months to four years. These positions are intended to give municipalities flexibility to meet
17There have been several scandals related to fraud in civil service examinations in recent years.
In 2012 the federal police investigated more than 1,700 cases of irregular civil service examinations
in municipal and state governments throughout Brazil. https://www.vgnoticias.com.br/nacional/
fraudes-em-concursos-tem-17-mil-denuncias-investigadas/18502
18These hirings can be done under two legal categories: positions of trust (função de confiança) and
commissioned positions (cargos en comissão). The difference between the two is that former are reserved
for individuals who are already civil servants, and thus represent a promotion or change in responsibilities
(without having to meet any pre-determined criteria or undertake additional formal examinations), and the
latter allow hiring individuals from outside the civil service without going through competitive examinations.
Municipal secretaries are also exempt from civil service entrance examinations, although they are not included
in any of these two legal categories, as they are considered political appointees.
19This figure includes only cargos en comissão, since funçãoes de confiança are occupied by civil servants,
who return to their civil service positions when their discretionary appointments are terminated.
20For instance, in 2017 the municipal government of Candeias (a municipality in the state
of Bahia with almost 90,000 inhabitants) was found guilty of conducting more than 1,500
discretionary hirings that violated the constitutional requirement that these appointments
should be restricted to senior positions. http://www.jb.com.br/pais/noticias/2017/07/11/
mp-da-bahia-investiga-15-mil-cargos-comissionados-na-prefeitura-de-candeias
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temporary hiring needs and do not require passing a civil service examination.21 The types of
positions that can be filled using temporary contracts are specified by law, and focus mostly
on education, health, research, and emergency services. Mayors are required to justify the
hiring of temporary workers and can be prosecuted in case of misconduct.22 Temporary
workers accounted for 18% of total municipal public sector workers in 2013.
Overall, although Brazil has an extensive professional merit-based civil service, there is
ample room for mayors to hire workers outside the formal civil service rules.23 To what
extent mayors use this discretion to fill positions based on partisan or clientelistic motives
remains an open question. As discussed above, the fact that politicians have discretion in
hiring does not necessarily imply that they will favor their political supporters, as they could
use their appointment powers to bring well-qualified staff into government, irrespective of
their political affiliation.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Employer-Employee Matched Data
To analyze employment in the public and private sectors we use data from Relação Anual de
Informações Sociais (RAIS), an administrative dataset collected annually by the Brazilian
Ministry of Labor and Employment (Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego, MTE ) that contains
linked employer-employee records. This dataset includes both private and public sector
employees and constitutes a high quality census of the Brazilian formal labor market (Dix-
Carneiro and Kovak 2017). All public sector entities and registered firms are required by
law to report every worker formally employed at some point during the previous calendar
21Public sector employers are required by law to post a notice of the job search, describing the requirements
for the temporary position. Candidates only have to undergo a simplified selection process (Processo Seletivo
Simplificado), which can be limited to evaluating their CV’s.
22For instance, in 2017 the mayor of São Pedro da Aldeia (a municipality in the state of
Rio de Janeiro with about 90,000 inhabitants) was found guilty of irregularities in the hiring
of more than 3,000 temporary workers and was fined almost 80,000 Reais (about 25,000 U.S.
dollars). http://www.tce.rj.gov.br/web/guest/todas-noticias/-/asset_publisher/SPJsTl5LTiyv/
content/s-p-da-aldeia-prefeito-multado-por-irregularidades
23This is the case not only at the municipal level, but also at the state and federal levels. As described
above, temporary contracts and senior positions that do not require undergoing formal civil service exam-
inations accounted for more than 26% of total municipal public sector workers in 2013. This same figure
reached 19% at the state level in the same year. At the federal level, in 2013 there were more than 95,000
positions that could be appointed in a discretionary manner by the President and the heads of federal public
organizations. These include not only high-level officials, but also mid-level and even some relatively low-level
positions (OECD 2010).
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year. Employers face fines for late, incomplete, or inaccurate reports, and the MTE conducts
frequent checks to verify the accuracy of information reported. Data reported in RAIS are
used by the MTE to identify workers entitled to unemployment benefits (Seguro Desemprego)
and a minimum-wage supplement (Abono Salarial), so workers also have incentives to ensure
accurate reporting.
RAIS covers almost all formally employed workers in Brazil. It excludes interns, domestic
workers, the self-employed, and elected politicians.24 RAIS does not include information on
workers who are not formally employed. This is not a significant limitation for our main
analyses, which focus on public sector employment, as public sector workers are formally
registered. However, this could be a limitation for analyzing private sector employment,
given the high degree of labor market informality in Brazil.25
The data reported in RAIS consist of job records and include worker and establishment
identifiers, allowing us to track workers and employers over time. For each job record, the
data include information on the hiring and separation dates, hours worked, gross earnings,
and occupation. They also include information on worker characteristics, such as age, gender,
race, and education.
We classify employment in three categories, based on the legal nature of the employer:
municipal public sector, state and federal public sector (including government-owned firms),
and private sector. A small fraction of workers have more than one job in the same year
and sector (e.g., a worker having two different jobs in the private sector in the same year);
we keep these multiple job records in our sample. Our results can thus be interpreted as
referring to the number of jobs, and not necessarily to the number of workers employed.26
We exclude repeated observations and observations with missing employer, worker, or
municipality identifiers, and restrict the sample to workers aged between 15 and 75. Together,
these cleaning procedures drop less than one percent of the original observations. Our RAIS
data cover the period 2002-2013 and we have data on 90.5 million workers, with 651.4 million
job-year observations.
24We exclude individuals who run for office in a given election from our analysis, as they might differ
from other political party members. We obtain similar results if we include them, as they only represent a
relatively small fraction of all party members.
25Labor market informality in Brazil declined over our sample period, but still remains high. The share
of total workers accounted for by employees without a formal contract (sem carteira de trabalho assinada)
and the self employed, a commonly used proxy for labor market informality, decreased from 46.9% in 2002
to 39.5% in 2013. See Carvalho Filho and Estevão (2012) and Cardoso (2016) for discussions of the recent
evolution of labor market informality in Brazil.
26As an alternative, we restricted our sample to one job per worker in each sector and year, keeping the
highest paying job in each sector, and found results similar to those reported throughout the paper.
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3.2 Party Membership Data
To identify political party members, we use individual-level data on all party members in
Brazil from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), which oversees all local, state, and federal
elections. Political parties are required by law to submit up to date lists of all their members
to the TSE in April and October of every year. Party membership registries are kept in
electronic format and are submitted to TSE through an online system. TSE checks the
information reported by the parties and matches it with other databases to ensure its quality
(Speck 2014). For each political party, these data include the name of all members, the
municipally where they are registered, the date when they joined the party, and the date
when their party membership was cancelled (if any). These data thus allow us to identify all
political party members in Brazil at a given point in time.
A potential concern about these data is that individuals may not formally de-register
from a political party, even if they are no longer involved in party activities. Also, anecdotal
evidence suggests that in some cases individuals may sign up as party members in exchange
for a small favor from politicians, and even without much informed consent. As a result,
formal party membership might not necessarily reflect active participation in party activities.
However, survey evidence suggests a relatively high active involvement of party members. For
instance, according to the World Values Survey (WVS), in 2006 more than half of those who
declared being members of a political party in Brazil claimed to be active members. This
figure was among the highest of the 56 countries covered in the survey. In any case, if formal
party membership is a noisy measure of actual involvement in party activities, this would
bias our results towards finding no effect of being a member of the winning party on public
sector employment.27
We exclude repeated observations, observations with missing data, and also individuals
who are members of more than one party at the same time. We also exclude individuals who
are registered with a party for less than a year. After these cleaning procedures, we are left
with a sample of about 14.8 million individuals that are party members at some point during
the period 2002-2013.
For our analyses, we consider individuals’ party membership with a one year lag to reduce
the potential impact of contemporaneous changes in party membership. Using contemporane-
ous membership does not affect our results. We also estimated all our regressions considering
27We also conducted our analyses classifying as party members only individuals who joined the political
party in the previous five years, because recent members might be more likely to be actively involved party
activities, and obtained results similar to those reported throughout the paper.
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individuals’ party membership in the electoral year and maintaining it constant for the whole
mayoral term to avoid capturing changes in party membership that occurred following the
elections, and obtained results similar to those reported throughout the paper.
3.3 Electoral Data
Our data cover the period 2002-2013. There are two mayoral elections during this period
(2004 and 2008), so we focus our analysis on the mayoral terms 2005-2008 and 2009-2012, for
which we have information for all years. We use electoral data from TSE to determine the
incumbent party, the winning and runner-up parties, and each party’s vote share. Data on the
parties that comprise local electoral coalitions and data on mayoral candidate characteristics
also come from TSE.28
3.4 Construction of Main Variables
We match the data on formal employment from RAIS to the data on party membership
from TSE by full name and municipality using a fuzzy matching algorithm.29 Out of a
total of 14.8 million party members in our dataset, we are able to match 38% to RAIS.30
As a comparison, according to estimates from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and
Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, IBGE ) the fraction of the working
age population employed in the formal sector averaged about 35% over our sample period,
so our matching rate is broadly in line with this figure.
For our main analyses, we aggregate the individual employment data for members of all
political parties that are part of either the winning or the runner-up local electoral coalitions
up to the municipality, coalition, and mayoral term level. So for each municipality and
28Electoral coalitions must formally register with electoral authorities, so we can objectively identify them.
29Our conclusions are not sensitive to different levels of precision in the matching algorithm, and are also
similar if we use only exact matches.
30A potential concern regarding the matching between the party membership data and the RAIS data
might be that the quality of the matching may differ across parties and might be correlated with the char-
acteristics of party members. For instance, members of some parties may be more likely to work in the
informal sector and thus might be less likely to be matched with the formal employment data in RAIS. We
find that the distribution of party members across parties for the matched data is similar to that of the
overall population of party members. Also, this is not a significant limitation for our main analyses, which
focus on public sector employment, as public sector workers are formally registered. Moreover, our empirical
approach, which exploits close races within a given municipality, controls for differences across parties. The
results reported in Appendix Table A.6 show that the winning and runner-up coalitions in close electoral
races have similar number of party members before the elections, irrespective of whether we consider all party
members or only those that we are able to match with RAIS.
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mayoral term we have two observations: one for members of political parties that are part
of the electoral coalition that won the mayoral election, and one for members of parties in
the electoral coalition that finished second in the same election. For simplicity, we refer to
these alternatively as party members or coalition members throughout the text. We focus
on coalitions because, as mentioned above, most parties compete in local elections as part of
electoral coalitions.31
We use several variables to analyze the employment of party members of the winning
and runner-up coalitions in the municipal bureaucracy. Our main measure of employment
is the number of members of political parties belonging to each coalition employed in the
municipal public sector at any point in a given year, averaged over the mayoral term. To
provide a relative measure of the employment of party members, we also calculate the ratio
of the number of members of each coalition employed in the municipal public sector to total
municipal public sector workers in each year, and then take the average of this ratio over
the mayoral term. To analyze worker flows, we construct measures of hires and separations.
In particular, we calculate the total number of party members of each coalition hired by the
municipal public sector over the whole mayoral term.32 We also scale this variable by the
total number of workers hired by the municipal public sector over the mayoral term. Finally,
to analyze separations, we calculate the annual separation rate (defined as number of party
members belonging to a given coalition that leave the municipal bureaucracy in a year divided
by the total number of members of that coalition working in the municipal bureaucracy at
any point during the same year) and then take the average of this ratio over the mayoral
term.33,34 We construct all these measures separately for the winning and runner-up coalitions
31We also estimated all our regressions considering only members of the leading party in the winning or
runner-up coalitions, instead of aggregating members of all the parties in each coalition, and obtained results
similar to those reported throughout the paper. Some of these results are reported in Appendix Table A.9.
32We define a hire in year t as a worker who is working for an employer (e.g., the municipal administration)
at some point during year t and was not working for the same employer at any point during year t-1. We
calculate the total number of hires in the mayoral term by adding up the number of hires in each year of the
term.
33We define a separation in year t as a worker who is working for an employer (e.g., the municipal
government) at some point in year t and is not working for the same employer at any point during year t+1.
For workers who are working for an employer as of December 31st of year t, but are not working for the
same employer at any point during year t+1 we classify their firing as occurring in year t+1. This choice has
no effect on our estimates at the municipality-term level, but affects the time-series patterns we observe for
separation rates, particularly in the first year of the mayoral term.
34For all our regressions, when analyzing variables in levels (employment and hires) we take the logarithm
of one plus the variable. We use the log specification due to the skewness of these variables. We take the
logarithm of one plus the variable to include municipalities where the number of party members of either the
winning or runner-up coalition employed or hired in the municipal public sector is zero. We obtain results
similar to those reported throughout the paper if we exclude these observations, as they account for less than
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in each municipality and term. In addition to our analysis at the municipality-term-coalition
level, we also exploit the time series dimension of our data and analyze the employment of
party members at the municipality-year-coalition level.
We construct similar measures of employment classifying jobs into occupational cate-
gories, using the Brazilian Occupational Classification (Classificação Brasileira de Ocupações,
CBO). In particular, we classify jobs in five broad categories based on the first digit of the
CBO: Senior officials and managers; Professionals; Mid-level technicians; Clerks; and Blue
collar workers.35 We also present data for a subset of the first category, focusing on the most
senior officials in the municipal government, such as municipal secretaries, budget directors,
and heads of government departments.36
In addition to studying the employment of party members, we also analyze their indi-
vidual characteristics, such as education and wages. We also estimate the residuals from a
Mincerian equation, defined over a large set of individual characteristics, to obtain a mea-
sure of personal ability, following the approach of Besley et al. (2017). In particular, for
every year, state, and gender we estimate separate regressions of (log) earnings on a set of
dummy variables for age, education, race, and industry, including a full set of interactions
among these variables.37 This flexible specification allows for time-varying returns to educa-
tion, which might also differ across states, gender, race, and industries, and also allows for
different age-earnings profile across industries, states, gender, and education. We estimate
separate wage regressions for the municipal public sector, state and federal public sector,
and the private sector. If ability is priced in the market, then wage residuals in the private
sector should reflect personal ability. On the other hand, public sector pay is not set in
competitive markets. Wages in the public sector are rarely linked to performance or effort,
as the goals of many public agencies are multi-dimensional and hard to measure, making per-
formance contracting very difficult (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Baker 2002; Cameron,
1% of the observations in our sample. We winsorize all the variables calculated as ratios at the one percent
level to reduce the potential influence of outliers. This procedure does not affect the results.
35Senior officials and managers correspond to CBO main group 1; Professionals correspond to CBO main
group 2; and Mid-level technicians to main group 3. Clerks encompass main groups 4 (administrative
services workers) and 5 (service workers and shop and market sales workers). Blue collar workers encompass
main groups 6 (agricultural and fishery workers), 7 and 8 (industrial goods and services workers), and 9
(maintenance and repairs workers).
36This category corresponds to CBO sub-group 11.
37Our measure of earnings is gross and includes salary payments, performance-based bonuses, and com-
missions. The control variables included in the Mincerian regression are: a set of age indicators (defined over
five-year intervals), a set of educational attainment indicators (separate dummies for completed high school;
some college; and completed college or more), a dummy for white race, and a set of 17 industry indica-
tors based on the major categories of the Brazilian National Economic Activity Classification (Classificação
Nacional de Atividades Econômicas, CNAE ). The regressions also include municipality fixed effects.
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de Figueiredo and Lewis 2016). Also, civil service regulations typically limit the use of high-
powered incentives (Johnson and Libecap 1994; Maranto 1998; Maranto 2001). Moreover,
public sector workers might have some ability to determine their wages through the political
process, particularly when they have strong labor unions (Freeman 1986; Zax and Ichniowski
1988; Brueckner and Neumark 2014). All these factors imply that public sector wages might
not reflect productivity, and as a result wage residuals in this sector might not be interpreted
as a measure of individual ability.
3.5 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 presents descriptive statistics for political party membership in Brazil. In particular,
the top graph shows the evolution of the ratio of political party members to the electorate
for the period 1997-2013. Political party membership increased over this period from about
6.4% of the electorate in 1997 to 10.5% in 2013.38 This represents more than 8 million new
party members over this period. This increase contrasts with the evidence from developed
countries, which shows a marked decline in the number of party members in most European
countries in recent decades (Dalton and Weldon 2005; Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 2012).
Moreover, the level of formal party membership seems quite high by international standards,
as political party membership is below 5% of the electorate in most European countries
(Scarrow 2015; Kölln 2016). The number of formal party members tends to follow a clear time
pattern, increasing in the year before the municipal elections and then remaining relatively
stable. This seems to be the result of electoral laws and internal party rules, which require
members to be registered with a party for at least a year before the elections to be eligible to
run for office and to be able to participate in municipal party conventions.39 This suggests
that internal party politics and candidate selection at the local level are major drivers of
party membership (Speck 2013, Speck 2014). As shown in the bottom graph of Figure 1,
party membership differs significantly across municipalities, with the ratio of political party
members to the electorate exceeding 20% in more than 1,500 municipalities. Moreover, party
membership tends to be higher (in relative terms) in smaller municipalities.
38Self-reported measures of party membership based on surveys show similar levels of party membership in
Brazil. For instance, according to the World Values Survey, in 2006 10.2% of Brazilian respondents claimed
to be members of a political party.
39Most parties require members to be registered for at least six months to participate in municipal party
conventions, which traditionally took place in June of the electoral year. Parties also require a minimum
level of participation of local members for these conventions to be valid, which might drive local party leaders
to recruit new members. The minimum period of party membership required by law to run for office was
reduced to six months in 2015.
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Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our matched individual-level data on employment
and party membership, comparing workers who are never affiliated with a political party
between 2002 and 2013 (column (1)) with workers who are members of a political party at
some point during our sample period (column (2)). Panel A presents descriptive statistics for
all the workers in our data, while Panel B compares the characteristics of party members and
non-party members working in the municipal public sector, which is the main focus of our
analysis. Panel A shows that, out of a total of 90.5 million workers in our RAIS sample, only
5.6 million are members of a political party at some point during our sample period. We find
that party members are more likely to work in the public sector than non-party members.
About 42% of the members of political parties worked in the public sector at some point
during our sample period, with 17% of them working exclusively in the public sector. These
figures stood at 17% and 10%, respectively, for non-party members. This pattern is consistent
with survey evidence from European countries, which also show that political party members
are more likely to be employed in the public sector (Koole and van Holsteyn 1999; Spier et
al. 2011). This might be because party members have better access to public sector jobs due
to their political connections, but could also reflect that they have a higher ability and/or
willingness to work in the public sector than non-party members. In terms of individual
characteristics, Panel B shows that party members that work in the municipal bureaucracy
tend to be older and are less likely to be women than non-party members who also work in
the municipal public sector. This is consistent with surveys of party members from European
countries, which also find that party members ted to be older than non-members and are
disproportionately male (Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 2012; Scarrow 2015). We also find
that party members on average have fewer years of education, but have higher salaries, once
we account for individual level characteristics.40
Brazil has 5,567 municipalities. After eliminating municipalities where only one candidate
ran in the mayoral elections and municipalities with missing data, we are left with a sample
of 5,532 municipalities for the mayoral terms 2005-2008 and 2009-2012.41
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the main measures of employment in the munic-
ipal public sector used in our empirical analysis. Panel A shows statistics for all municipal
40We conducted t-tests to compare the means of the different individual characteristics between political
party members and non-members working in the municipal public sector and found that the differences are
statistically significant for all variables.
41We have data on 5,364 municipalities for the term 2005-2008 and 5,272 municipalities for the term 2009-
2012. We have data for both mayoral terms for 5,104 municipalities. We also estimated all our regressions
restricting the sample to municipalities that we observe twice during our sample period and obtained results
similar to those reported throughout the paper.
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public sector workers. Panels B and C display statistics for party members employed in the
municipal public sector that belong to the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate or
the coalition of the runner-up mayoral candidate, respectively. The figures in Panel A show
that the average municipality in our sample has 978 municipal public sector employees and
hires 644 workers over the mayoral term. Regarding party members, the statistics in Table
2 show that party members belonging to the winning mayoral coalition account for 9.8% of
total municipal public sector employees on average (Panel B), while party members of the
runner-up coalition represent 6.1% on average (Panel C). While this difference could indicate
that mayors tend to hire members of their own parties, it might also reflect differences in the
number of members and/or their characteristics between the winning and runner-up parties.
Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of municipal public sector employment over our sample
period. Figure 2.1 shows the number of employees working in the municipal bureaucracy
averaged across the municipalities in our sample. The average number of municipal public
sector employees increased from 658 in 2002 to almost 1,158 in 2013. This reflects both
an increase in the total number of public sector workers and, more importantly, a grow-
ing participation of municipal bureaucracies in overall public sector employment, as a result
of increasing decentralization. Brazil showed a strong labor market performance over our
sample period, with significant job creation, particularly in the formal sector. As a result,
unemployment and informality decreased significantly and hit record lows, despite an increas-
ing labour force participation rate (Menezes-Filho and Scorzafave 2007; Silva, Almeida and
Strokova 2015). Reflecting the significant expansion in formal private sector employment,
the ratio of municipal public sector workers to total formal sector workers decreased over our
sample period, from an average across municipalities of 43% in 2002 to 39% in 2013 (Figure
2.2). Despite this decrease, the municipal public sector is still a major employer in many
municipalities, accounting for more than a third of formal sector employment in almost 2,600
of the municipalities in our sample in 2013.42
4 Empirical Strategy
Identifying the causal effect of being the party in office on the public employment of mem-
bers of the ruling party is challenging, as party membership is likely to be correlated with
42The fraction of formal sector employment accounted for by municipal public sector workers is significantly
higher in smaller municipalities. If we consider the median across municipalities of this fraction, we observe
a decrease from 36% in 2002 to 32% in 2013. At an aggregate level, municipal public sector employment
accounted for about 9% of total formal employment in Brazil in 2013.
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both public sector employment and electoral outcomes. Comparing the public sector em-
ployment of members of a given party between municipalities where the party is in power
and municipalities where it is not, is likely to generate biased estimates, as municipality
characteristics such as voter preferences and demographics could be correlated both with the
employment of party members in the municipal public sector and with electoral outcomes.
Even a comparison between the employment of party members of different parties within
a given municipality might generate biased estimates. Parties that are more popular in a
given municipality are more likely to win local elections and might also have more members
working in the municipal bureaucracy, because their members account for a higher fraction
of the local population. Moreover, not only the number of party members but also their
characteristics might differ across parties, and this could also be correlated with electoral
outcomes. For instance, parties whose members have a higher ability and/or willingness to
work in the public sector might have more municipal employees and also be more likely to get
elected. Therefore, directly comparing outcomes for different parties in a given municipality
could result in a correlation between electoral success and public sector employment that
does not reflect a casual effect.
To deal with this challenge and address the presence of both time-invariant and time-
varying confounding factors, we estimate the causal effect of party membership on public
sector employment using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) in close races within
municipality. In particular, for a given municipality and mayoral term, we compare the
employment in the municipal public sector of members of the party that barely won an
election with that of members of the party that barely lost the election (i.e., the runner-up
party). This approach provides quasi-random assignment of the winner party. The intuition
for our identification strategy is that, within a given municipality, parties that lost an election
by a narrow margin can be a good counterfactual for parties that won that same election by
a narrow margin. Note that, differently from other settings, in our case we observe outcomes
(e.g., public sector employment) in a given municipality and mayoral term both for members
of the winning party and for members of the runner-up party. This allows us to analyze close
races within a given municipality, comparing outcomes between parties and abstracting from
any differences across municipalities.
Our main outcome of interest is the public sector employment of members of the party
of the winning/runner-up mayoral candidate in a given municipality and term. We start our
analysis aggregating all outcomes at the municipality, electoral coalition, and mayoral term
level.
21
Define τpmj(1) as the potential public sector employment of members of party p in mu-
nicipality m and mayoral term j if party p is in power, and τpmj(0) as the potential public
sector employment of members of the same party in the same municipality and term if the
party is not in power. We are interested in estimating the difference in potential outcomes,
but the problem of causal inference is that, at a given point in time, we cannot observe both
potential outcomes. The variable Winnerpmj defines the treatment status: Winnerpmj = 1
if party p is in power in municipality m and mayoral term j, and Winnerpmj = 0 otherwise,
The observed outcome is thus τpmj = Winnerpmj · τpmj(1) + (1−Winnerpmj) · τpmj(0). The
estimand of interest is the average treatment effect (ATE): E[τpmj(1)− τpmj(0)].
Our analysis focuses on the mayoral terms 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. We consider the
mayoral elections held in October 2004 and 2008 to calculate the margin of victory of party
p in the mayoral elections in municipality m before term j (MVpmj).43 At the threshold
MVpmj = 0 there is a sharp change in Winnerpmj: for MVpmj > 0 the candidate won
the election in 2004 (2008), so she is in power in the term 2005-2008 (2009-2012), that is,
Winnerpmj = 1. For MVpmj < 0 the candidate lost the election in 2004 (2008), so she is not
in power in the term 2005-2008 (2009-2012), Winnerpmj = 0. MVpmj can be considered as
a random variable that depends on both observable and unobservable factors, as well as on
random events on election day. The standard RDD assumption is that potential outcomes
must be a continuous function of the running variable (margin of victory in our case) at the
threshold (Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw 2001). We indirectly test this assumption in
Section 5.2 below.
The ATE in close elections is thus:
γ ≡ E[τpmj(1)− τpmj(0)|MVpmj = 0] = lim
↓0
E[τpmj|MVpmj = ]− lim
↑0
E[τpmj|MVpmj = ]
(E.1)
where γ is a local effect that captures the impact of winning the election (and being the
party in power over the corresponding mayoral term) on the outcome of interest (e.g., public
sector employment) only for parties around the threshold MV = 0 (i.e. for elections that
were decided for a margin that is tiny enough).
43We consider the margin of victory between the first and the second mayoral candidates in terms of share
of votes. Our sample includes all municipalities where at least two mayoral candidates ran. We obtain similar
results if we restrict our analysis to races with only two candidates. These results are reported in Appendix
Table A.7.
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4.1 Estimation
We first analyse whether winning office is correlated with the employment of party members
in the municipal public sector by estimating the following OLS equation:
τpmj = pi0Winnerpmj + αj + σm + θpj + εpmj (E.2)
where τpmjt is a measure of the public sector employment of members of party p, in munici-
pality m, in term j. Winnerpmj is a dummy that equals one if party p won the elections and
is in power in municipality m and mayoral term j, and zero otherwise (i.e., for the runner-up
party). αj are term fixed effects; σm are municipality fixed effects; θpj are political party-
term fixed effects; and standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. We report the
coefficient pˆi0, which does not have a casual interpretation, as party membership is likely to
be correlated with both public sector employment and electoral outcomes.
To estimate the ATE in equation (E.1) we use two different methods, following the litera-
ture. First, we fit a q-order polynomial in MVpmj on either side of the threshold MVpmj = 0:
τpmj =
q∑
k=0
ρkMV
k
pmj +Winnerpmj
q∑
k=0
δkMV
k
pmj + αj + σm + θpj + εpmj (E.3)
where all the variables are defined as above. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level.44,45 The estimated coefficient δˆ0 identifies the ATE at the threshold MVpmj = 0. We
follow the standard procedure in the literature (Gelman and Imbens 2017) and present results
for a second order polynomial.46 Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we also use a local
linear regression approach, which restricts the sample to observations in the intervalMVpmj ∈
[−h,+h] and estimates the following regression:
τpmj = ρ0 + ρ1MVpmj + δ1Winnerpmj + δ0Winnerpmj ·MVpmj + αj + σm + θpj + εpmj (E.4)
Again, δˆ0 identifies the ATE at the thresholdMVpmj = 0. We estimate the optimal bandwidth
44These regressions include separate municipality and term fixed effects. We also estimated all our re-
gressions including municipality-term fixed effects instead and obtained results similar to those reported
throughout the paper. When including municipality-term fixed effects, we cannot include the interaction
between the winner dummy and the margin of victory due to collinearity (because the margin of victory is
the same, with opposite sign, for the winner and the runner-up party in a given municipality and election).
We report results with separate term and municipality fixed effects to make our results comparable to the
literature.
45 We also estimated all our regressions using the multi-way clustering method of Cameron, Gelbach and
Miller (2011), clustering at municipality and political party dimensions and found similar results.
46 We also estimated all our regressions considering a third-order polynomial and obtained similar results.
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h using the algorithm by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). We also present results
considering three alternative bandwidths: 5%, 2.5%, and 1%.
Finally, we also exploit the time series dimension of our data, extending our RDD in
close races within municipality to a difference-in-difference (DiD) framework, using annual
data. To do this, for each municipality and mayoral term, we use seven annual observations,
including three years before the beginning of the term and the four years of the term, and we
have two observations per year, one for members of the winning party and one for members
of the runner-up party.
We estimate the following regression:
τpmjt = β0Winnerpmj +
4∑
t=1
γt(Y eart ·Winnerpmj) +
4∑
t=−2
q∑
k=1
ρkt(Y eart ·MV kpmj)+
4∑
t=−2
q∑
k=1
δkt(Y eart ·Winnerpmj ·MV kpmj) + σm + αjt + θpjt + pmjt (E.5)
where τpmjt is some outcome of interest (e.g., public sector employment) for members of
party p, in municipality m, in period (e.g., year) t of term j. t is defined relative to the
electoral year and it goes from -2 (two years before the elections) to +4 (four years after
the elections, the end of the mayoral term). Y eart are dummy variables for period t. We
include municipality fixed effects (σm), term-period fixed effects (αjt), and political party-
term-period fixed effects (θpjt).47 We allow the effect of the margin of victory to vary not only
between winners and runner-ups, but also over time. The estimated coefficients of interest
γˆ1, γˆ2, γˆ3, and γˆ4 identify the ATE of winning an election on the outcome for each year of the
mayoral term, compared to the excluded category. This allows us to analyze how the effect
of winning an election on the employment of members of the wining party in the municipal
bureaucracy varies over time during the mayoral term, rather than measuring the average
effect of winning over the four years of the mayoral term as our term-level analysis. We
estimate these ATEs using a second order polynomial.48
To illustrate the results of our RDD difference-in-difference estimations, we also present
47 We also estimated all our regressions including municipality-term-period fixed effects, instead of separate
municipality and term-period fixed effects, and obtained results similar to those reported throughout the
paper. When including municipality-term-period fixed effects, we cannot include the interaction between the
winner dummy and the margin of victory due to collinearity (because the margin of victory is the same, with
opposite sign, for the winning and runner-up parties in a given municipality and election). We report results
with separate term-period and municipality fixed effects to make our results comparable to the literature.
48We also estimated these ATEs using local linear regressions with different bandwidths (5%, 2.5%, and
1%) and found similar results.
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some graphical results, plotting the estimated coefficients from a regression similar to (E.5),
allowing the difference between the winner and runner-up parties to vary over time not only
during the mayoral term, but also before the beginning of the term. In particular, we estimate
the following regression:
τpmjt = β0Winnerpmj +
4∑
t=−2
γt(Y eart ·Winnerpmj) +
4∑
t=−2
q∑
k=1
ρkt(Y eart ·MV kpmj)+
4∑
t=−2
q∑
k=1
δkt(Y eart ·Winnerpmj ·MV kpmj) + σm + αjt + θpjt + pmjt (E.6)
where all variables are defined as above. We drop the γt coefficient for the electoral year
(t = 0) due to collinearity, so all γt coefficients capture differences relative to the year before
the start of the term.
5 Effect of Winning Office on the Employment of Party
Members in the Municipal Public Sector
5.1 Main Results
Table 3 present our main estimates of the effect of being in office on the employment of
members of the ruling party in the municipal bureaucracy, using a Regression Discontinuity
Design in close races within municipality. For each municipality and mayoral term we have
two observations, one for members of political parties belonging to the winning local electoral
coalition and one for members of parties in the runner-up coalition. The dependent variable
in Panel A is (the log of one plus) the number of party members of each coalition working in
the municipal public sector in a given year, averaged over the mayoral term. The dependent
variable in Panel B is the ratio of the number of party members of each coalition employed
in the municipal public sector to total municipal public sector workers in each year, averaged
over the mayoral term. Column (1) reports OLS estimates following equation (E.2). Column
(2) presents RDD estimates following equation (E.3), using a second-order polynomial in the
margin of victory. Columns (3) to (6) present local linear regression estimates based on equa-
tion (E.4) and considering alternative bandwidths: optimal bandwidth calculated following
Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) (column (3)), 5% (column (4)), 2.5% (column (5)),
and 1% (column (6)).
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The results in Table 3 show that winning a mayoral election has a positive and significant
effect on the employment of members of the winning party in the municipal bureaucracy.
The results in Panel A imply that the number of members of the winning party employed by
the municipal public sector in a given municipality and term is around 35% to 41% higher
than the same figure for members of the runner-up party. This represents between 14 and 17
additional jobs in the municipal public sector for members of the winning party. The results
in Panel B are consistent with these findings and imply that winning an election leads to an
increase in the fraction of total municipal public sector employees accounted for by members
of the winning party of between 2 and 2.5 percentage points (relative to members of the
runner-up party).
Figure 3 illustrates the results of our RDD estimates. In particular, this figure shows
scatterplots of the dependent variables analyzed in Table 3. The variable on the x-axis is
the margin of victory, and observations are averaged within bins of two percent of margin of
victory. We plot the average of our dependent variables for party members belonging to the
winning coalition (to the right of the cutoff MVpmj = 0) and for party members belonging to
the runner-up coalition (to the left of the cutoff MVpmj = 0). Consistent with the results in
Table 3, we find a clear discontinuity around the cut-off, indicating that winning an election
leads to significant increase in the number of members of the winning party working in the
municipal public sector, both in absolute terms and as a fraction of total municipal public
sector employees.
The results in Table 3 show that winning an election leads to an increase in the em-
ployment of members of political parties belonging to the coalition of the winning mayoral
candidate in the municipal bureaucracy, relative to members of parties in the runner-up coali-
tion. This finding could be driven either by increased hiring of party members of the ruling
coalition or by a reduction in the employment of supporters of the runner-up candidate (or
a combination of the two).49 To try to disentangle these two possible channels, we analyze
worker flows into and out of the municipal bureaucracy.50
Table 4 reports the results of our RDD estimates analyzing hires and separations. Panel
A presents RDD estimates following equation (E.3), using a second-order polynomial in the
margin of victory. Panels (B) and (C) present local linear regression estimates, based on
equation (E.4) and considering observations within a bandwidth of 2.5% and 1% around
49Evidence from other countries suggests that politicians might discriminate against their opponents’
supporters (see, for instance, Tremewan 1996; Hsieh, Miguel and Ortega 2011; Fafchamps and Labonne
2017).
50While we can identify separations, we cannot accurately tell whether workers who leave the municipal
public sector do so voluntarily or are fired.
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the cut-off (MVpmj = 0), respectively. We find that winning an election has a positive and
significant effect on the hiring of members of the winning party by the municipal public
sector. For instance, the results in column (1) show that the number of members of parties
belonging to the winning coalition hired over the mayoral term is around 67% to 80% higher
than the same figure for members of parties in the runner-up coalition. This represents about
11 to 13 additional hirings of members of the winning party, which is broadly consistent with
the magnitudes we find in Table 3. We find similar effects when analyzing the share of total
hires by the municipal public sector accounted for by members of the winning/runner-up
coalitions (column (2)). Regarding separations, the results in column (3) suggest that the
average annual separation rate of members of the winning party is actually higher than that of
members of the runner-up party.51,52 This may be because some of the members of the ruling
party may be hired under temporary contracts and/or because some of them might leave the
municipal bureaucracy at the end of the mayoral term.53 In any case, these findings suggest
that the results in Table 3 are mostly driven by increased hiring of members of the ruling
party, and not by members of the opposition party leaving the municipal public sector.54
Figure 4 presents scatter plots of the outcome variables analyzed in Table 4. Visual inspec-
tion of these graphs confirms the results described above, as there are visible discontinuities
around the cut-off for all variables.55
51Note that the number of observations for the separation rate is slightly lower than for the other variables.
This is because a small number of municipalities do not employ any members of either the winning or the
runner-up parties, and thus we cannot calculate the separation rate for those observations.
52We find similar results if we analyze (the log of one plus) the number of separations, instead of the
separation rate. We focus on the separation rate because the number of separations could be affected by
the fact that the number of members of the winning party working in the municipal bureaucracy increases
after their party gets to power. Given this increase, we could find that more members of the winning party
leave the municipal bureaucracy at some point during the mayoral term, even if they actually had a lower
probability of leaving than members of the runner-up party.
53In unreported robustness tests, we differentiated between different types of contracts in the municipal
public sector and found that winning an election increases hiring of members of the winning party both under
temporary and permanent contracts.
54Table 7 analyzes how the effect of winning an election on the separation rate varies over time during the
mayoral term. The results show that members of the runner-up party are more likely to leave the municipal
public sector in the first year of the mayoral term (while the opposite is the case in all other years of the
term). However, this effect is relatively small and most of the relative increase in the number of members of
the winning party employed in the municipal pubic sector is driven by hiring of party members.
55In all these figures, outcomes are averaged into bins of intervals of the margin of victory. Given that
the density of the margin of victory is concentrated around zero, points closer to zero (close races) contain
more information compared to those far from the zero and are more relevant for the estimation of the split
second-order polynomial in margin of victory displayed in the figures and for our RDD estimates.
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5.2 Robustness and Extensions
Our main results show that winning an election leads to an increase in the number of party
members belonging to the winning electoral coalition employed in the municipal public sector.
To provide further evidence on the effects of winning office, we also analyze whether winning
a mayoral election has any effect on the employment of party members in the non-municipal
(i.e., state and federal) public sector. It is not clear what we should expect in this regard.
On the one hand, mayors have no control over employment in other levels of government,
so belonging to the party of the winning mayor may have no effect on employment of party
members at the state and federal levels. On the other hand, if state or federal authorities
need the support of mayors, they might hire their supporters. These results are reported
in Appendix Table A.2. We find no effect of belonging to the party of the winning mayor
on employment in other levels of government. We also analyze employment outcomes in the
private sector. Again, it s not clear whether we should expect to find any effects or not. Pri-
vate employers may increase their hiring of members of the winning party in the expectation
of political favors and/or to improve their connections with the municipal government. On
the other hand, some members of the winning party might leave the private sector to join
the municipal public sector.56 The results reported in Appendix Table A.3 show that there
is no effect of winning the mayoral elections on the employment of members of the winning
party in the private sector.57 Overall, these results indicate that our main findings reflect the
allocation of those jobs that the mayor can directly influence.
Our estimation strategy controls for time-invariant and time-varying differences across
parties within a given municipality. Therefore, we should not expect any differences between
treatment and control groups around the cutoff MVpmj = 0 before the beginning of the
mayoral term. Appendix Tables A.4 reports balance tests analyzing all the measures of
employment in the municipal public sector that we study in Tables 3 and 4 in the year
56Note that the fact that we find an increase in the number of members of the winning party working in
the municipal bureaucracy does not imply that we should observe a corresponding reduction in the number
of winning party members working in the formal private sector. Members of the winning party that are hired
by the municipal public sector could be coming from outside the labor force (e.g., if they were unemployed or
not looking for a job before being hired), from the informal sector, or from occupations not covered by RAIS,
such as self-employment. Indeed, we find that on average almost 70% of all workers hired by the municipal
public sector in a given year were not working in the formal sector in the previous year. The private sector
shows a similar pattern, with most of the new hires by private firms coming either from outside the labor
force, unemployment, or the informal sector, and not from other formal sector employers. See Hoek (2007)
and Bosch, Goni and Maloney (2007) for analyses of worker flows across sectors in Brazil.
57Gagliarducci and Manacorda (2017) find that private firms in Italy are more likely to grant jobs to
family members of politicians, in expectation for political favors. Our results may differ from theirs because
the type of ties that we analyze (being a member of the party of the mayor) are weaker.
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before the beginning of the mayoral term.58,59 We find that there are no differences in the
employment of members of the winning and the runner-up parties in the municipal public
sector before the start of the mayoral term in close races. Appendix Table A.5 reports
results for the total number of party members, as well as their characteristics, including age,
gender, race, education, and wages, showing no differences between treatment and control
groups around the cutoff MVpmj = 0 in the electoral year.60Overall, these results confirm
that our main findings reflect the causal effect of winning an election on the employment of
party members in the municipal public sector, and not any pre-existing differences between
members of the winning and runner-up parties in close races. In addition, Appendix Table A.6
reports the results of balance checks for several mayoral candidate characteristics, showing
that there is no discontinuity around the cutoff MVpmj = 0.
We conducted several additional tests to confirm the robustness of our results and provide
further evidence. First, we re-estimated the RDD local linear regressions presented in Table
3 considering alternative bandwidths. In particular, we estimated 50 separate regressions
for bandwidths of varying size from 0.005 to 0.25, considering increments of 0.005. The
results reported in Appendix Figure A.1 show that, although the estimates are somewhat
noisier closer to the threshold MVpmj = 0, we find statistically significant differences even
when considering a bandwidth of 0.005. Moreover, the size of the estimated coefficients is
relatively similar when considering narrow and broad bandwidths. This suggest that our
estimates do not just reflect something particular about close electoral races (for instance,
that after a close race, mayors might hire more party members in order to shore up support
amongst their base).
Second, Cattaneo et al. (2016) highlight than in electoral races with more than two
58Given that municipal elections take place at the beginning of October, for these balance tests we exclude
hires and separations that took place after September, to avoid capturing any changes in the employment
of party members in the municipal public sector that might have occurred after the elections. Indeed, if we
analyze separations after September we find a negative effect, suggesting that members of the winning party
were less likely to leave the municipal public sector once the electoral result was know, even though the new
mayoral term had not yet started.
59Note that the number of observations in Appendix Table A.4 differs slightly from that in Table 4 for
some variables. In particular, for the share of municipal hires there are fewer observations in Appendix Table
A.4 as some municipalities did not hire any workers in the electoral year (but might have hired workers at
some point during the following term, and thus are included in the analysis in Table 4). Similarly, for the
separation rate there fewer observations in Appendix Table A.4, as some municipalities did not employ any
members of either the winning or the runner-up coalitions in the year before the beginning of the term.
60Appendix Table A.5 reports results considering the characteristics of all members of the winning and
runner-up parties in a given municipality.We also conducted these balance tests restricting the sample to party
members employed in the municipal public sector and found similar results; that is, there is no difference in
the characteristics of members of the winning and runner-up parties working in the municipal bureaucracy
before the start of the mayoral term in close races.
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candidates, races decided by the same margin of victory might result in winners with very
different actual vote shares. This implies that RDD estimates that pool all races reflect the
average effect of barely winning at different cuts, which might be correlated with the electoral
environment. To address this concern, we re-estimated all the regressions reported in Tables
3 and 4 considering only races involving two candidates, for which the victory cutoff is always
50% of the vote. The results are reported in Appendix Table A.7 and show that we obtain
similar results when restricting the sample to two-candidate races.
Third, as described above, we aggregate up the outcomes for members of all political
parties that belong either to the winning or the runner-up coalitions, because most parties run
in the mayoral elections as part of electoral coalitions. As a robustness check, we re-estimated
our results without aggregating outcomes for all the parties that belong to a coalition, but
rather considering only members of the leading party in the runner-up or winning coalitions.
These results are reported in Appendix Table A.8 and show that we find similar results
when considering only the leading parties in each coalition. The estimated coefficients for
the percentage changes (i.e., columns (1) and (3)) are larger than in our main regressions,
suggesting that the leading party in the winning coalition may favor its own members in
hiring, relative to members of the other parties in the coalition.61
Fourth, our results on the level of employment of party members in the municipal public
sector could be affected by party switching if individuals who had public sector jobs before the
election become members of the ruling party (or quit the runner-up party) after the election.
The fact that we find that our results are mostly accounted for by the hiring of party members
shows that changes in the party membership of pre-existing public sector workers are not
driving our results. To address this concern more directly, we re-estimated all our regressions
taking an individual’s political party membership in the electoral year (before October, when
the elections take place) and maintaining it constant for the whole mayoral term to avoid
capturing changes in party membership that occurred after the elections. Appendix Table
A.9 presents these results, which are similar to those reported throughout the paper. In
terms of economic magnitude, we find that winning an election leads to between 10 and 13
additional jobs in the municipal public sector for members of the winning coalition. This
figure is slightly lower than the one for the same specification in Table 4 suggesting that
party switching accounts for a relatively small fraction of our results. Estimates for hirings
are of similar magnitude as those in Table 4 and show that the higher number of members
61The estimates that capture the employment and hiring of party members relative to the totals for the
municipal public sector are, of course, smaller because we are considering a smaller number of party members
when we only focus the leading parties in each coalition.
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of the winning coalition working in the municipal public sector is driven by increased hiring
following the elections.
Finally, in addition to our RDD in close races within municipality, we also conducted an
RDD in close races across municipalities, which is similar to standard regression discontinu-
ity designs in the literature. In particular, for a given party, we compare the public sector
employment of its members in municipalities where the party barely won an election with mu-
nicipalities where the party barely lost an election. We view this approach as complementary
to our main empirical approach, and it can provide additional information, by highlighting
any differences across parties in the extent to which they favor their party members in hir-
ing. The results from this alternative identification strategy are discussed in Appendix B.
Overall, we find that considering an RDD in close races across municipalities, within a given
party, yields similar results as our main approach. Moreover, we do not find any qualitative
differences across parties, as all parties increase the hiring of their own members when they
win the mayoral elections.62
5.3 Differences across Occupations
The results reported above show that winning an election leads to an increase in the number
of members of the winning party employed in the municipal public sector, indicating that
mayors use their discretionary powers to grant jobs to their party members. As discussed in
the Introduction, this could reflect the use of jobs as tool to gain political support. But it
might also be a way of making the bureaucracy more responsive to political leadership and
electoral pledges. This potential benefit of political discretion over the bureaucracy is likely
to be more relevant for senior management positions (Müller 2006).63 To provide evidence
62As an alternative, to analyze whether the effects we find differ across political parties, we also estimated
our main regressions interacting our baseline RD spline polynomial specification with different dummy vari-
ables for the main political parties in Brazil. It is worth stressing that while these interaction terms provide
information about the heterogeneity of the effect of being the party in power, they cannot be interpreted as
causal. We find that the interaction terms are not statistically significant in most cases, suggesting that all the
major political parties increase the hiring of their own members to a relatively similar extent when in power
at the local level. This finding is consistent with some existing evidence on discretionary appointments at the
national level in other countries. For instance, Dahlström and Niklasson (2013) find that left and centre-right
governments in Sweden tend to make political appointments to approximately the same degree. Similarly,
Lewis (2010) and Bumgarner and Newswander (2012) find that Republican and Democratic presidents make
political appointments more or less to the same extent.
63Appointments to senior positions could also be used as a way to reward party members and promote
party cohesion, as these positions might offer higher salaries, contacts, and prestige. Thus, the level of
politically appointed positions can only provide suggestive evidence on the motivations for discretionary
appointments.
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in this regard, in this Section we analyze the employment of members of the winning and
runner-up parties in different occupational categories in the public sector.
Table 5 reports these results. In particular, we estimate separate regressions for each occu-
pational category following equation (E.3), using a second-order polynomial in the margin of
victory.64 The dependent variable in Panel A is (the log of one plus) the number of members
of the winning or runner-up coalitions employed in each occupation in each year, averaged
over the mayoral term. The dependent variable in Panel B is the ratio of the number of party
members of each coalition employed in a given occupation to the total number of municipal
workers in that occupation, averaged over the mayoral term. Each column presents results
for a different occupational category.
The results reported in Table 5 show that winning a mayoral election has a positive and
significant effect on the employment of members of the winning party across all occupational
categories in the municipal bureaucracy. This effect is larger (in relative terms) for the top
positions. For instance, the estimates in column (1) of Panel A imply that the number of
members of the winning party employed as senior officials and managers in the municipal
public sector is almost 90% higher than the same figure for members of the runner-up party.
In contrast, this difference is less than 20% for mid-level technicians (column (4)) and blue
collar workers (column (6)). In absolute terms, the largest increase in the number of members
of the winning party working in the municipal bureaucracy is in clerical positions: the results
in column (5) imply that winning an election leads to 6 additional clerical jobs for members
of the winning party. Similar patterns are visible when analyzing the share of members of
the winning and runner-up parties in each occupation (Panel B). These results show that
winning an election leads to an increase of about 12 percentage points in the share of senior
positions in the municipal public sector held by members of the winning party, relative to
members of the runner-up party (columns (1) and (2)).
Figures 5 and 6 present scatter plots of the variables analyzed in Table 6 for the different
employment categories. In particular Figure 5 presents graphs for (the log of one plus) the
number of members of the winning and runner-up coalitions employed in each occupational
category and Figure 6 analyzes the share of party members of each coalition employed in
a given occupation. Visual inspection of these graphs confirms the results described above,
as there are visible discontinuities around the cut-off for all variables and occupational cate-
gories.
The results in Table 5 suggest that discretionary appointments to public sector jobs
64We also conducted these analyses using a local linear regression considering alternative bandwidths (5%,
2.5%, and 1%) and obtained similar results.
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are used by mayors both to control the management of public policies and to reward and
motivate supporters of the ruling party. In particular, the fact that the largest increase in
relative terms occurs for senior positions suggests that the need to align bureaucrat’s actions
with the interests of elected politicians is a major determinant of discretionary hiring by
mayors. Moreover, as described above, the law affords mayors more flexibility in hiring for
these positions. However, we also find large increases in the number of members of the
winning party in lower-ranked positions, such as clerical jobs, suggesting that the need to
reward supporters (either as an electoral tool or to help sustain the party organization) also
plays an important role in hiring decisions.
We also conducted several additional tests. First, we analyzed hirings and promotions
into senior positions in the bureaucracy. The higher number of members of the winning
party working in senior positions that we find in Table 6 could be driven either by the
promotion to these positions of members of the winning party that were already employed
in the municipal public sector before the party came to office, or by the hiring into these
positions of party members from outside the public sector after taking power. To disentangle
these two possible channels, we analyzed promotions and hirings into senior positions in the
municipal bureaucracy separately. These results, presented in Appendix Table A.10, show
that the higher number of members of the winning party working in senior positions is mostly
driven by hiring of party members from outside the public sector, with promotions playing
a smaller role.
Second, we also analyzed hirings for all other occupational categories and found that the
higher number of members of the winning party employed in the different occupations is
mostly accounted for by the hiring of party members following the elections.65
Finally, we also analyzed the effects of winning office on the wages of members of the
ruling party working in the municipal public sector for the different occupational categories.
Politicians could attract or reward their supporters by offering them not only jobs in the
public sector, but also higher paying jobs. To analyze whether this is the case, we estimated
regressions following equation (E.3), using as dependent variable (the log of) the average wage
of members of the winning and runner-up parties in the different occupational categories
in the public sector during the mayoral term. To account for potential differences in the
individual characteristics of members of the winning and runner-up parties, we also estimated
regressions using as dependent variable the average wage residuals of members of each party
in the different occupational categories, estimated from a Mincerian equation, as described
65We did not analyze promotions for these occupational categories, as we cannot identify hierarchies across
and within these categories.
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above. These results, reported in Appendix Table A.11, show that for all occupational
categories in the public sector, winning office has a positive effect on the wages and wage
residuals of members of the winning party (relative to members of the runner-up party).
Given that civil service regulations restrict the ability of mayors to set different wages for the
same position, these results are likely to reflect the fact that members of the winning party
might be employed in higher/better paying positions within each occupational category.
6 Effect of Winning Office on the Quality of Party Mem-
bers Hired by the Municipal Public Sector
The results presented above show that mayors use their discretionary powers to grant gov-
ernment jobs to members of their own political parties. A key question is whether this has
any effect on the quality of workers hired by the public sector. As discussed above, com-
mon stereotypes hold that discretionary appointees tend to lack the required expertise for
their jobs, as their appointment is based on political or personal connections, and not on
their qualifications. From this perspective, civil service proponents argue that meritocratic
recruitment is required to ensure the selection of qualified individuals. On the other hand,
politicians may have better information on the quality of members of their own party, which
might allow them to select good candidates. And the use of discretionary appointments is
not necessarily incompatible with competence, as elected officials have incentives to hire bu-
reaucrats who can perform their jobs effectively. From this perspective, office holders may
use discretionary appointments to hire high quality party members, as a way of ensuring
“responsive competence” (Suleiman 2003).
To study whether the use of discretionary appointments to hire members of the winning
party affects the quality of the workers selected, we analyze several characteristics of members
of the winning and runner-up parties hired by the municipal bureaucracy from the private
sector. In particular, we focus on (1) education, proxied by years of schooling; (2) private
sector wages; and (3) private sector wage residuals, estimated from a Mincerian equation
as described above. To conduct this analysis, we must restrict the sample to workers hired
from the private sector, as only for these workers we can observe private wages to construct
our measure of personal ability. For each of these three characteristics, we take its value in
the year before a worker joined the municipal bureaucracy and then calculate the average of
this variable over the whole mayoral term for members of the winning and runner-up parties
hired by the municipal public sector. We do this separately for each occupational category,
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as worker characteristics and qualifications are likely to differ across occupations.
Table 6 reports the results of our RDD estimates analyzing the quality of party members
hired by the public sector. In particular, we estimate separate regressions for each occupa-
tional category following equation (E.3), using a second-order polynomial in the margin of
victory.66 The dependent variable in Panel A is the average years of schooling of members
of the winning and runner-up coalitions hired from the private sector during the mayoral
term. The dependent variables in Panels B and C are the average private sector wage and
wage residuals, respectively, of party members of each coalition hired. Each column presents
results for a given occupational category.67
The results in Table 6 show that the quality of members of the winning party hired
after the party takes office is similar, if not higher, than that of members of the runner-up
party. In particular, the results in Panel (A) show that there are no significant differences in
terms of years of education between members of the winning and runner-up parties.68 When
analyzing private sector wages (Panel B) we find that members of the winning party hired
in senior positions in the municipal bureaucracy tend to have higher private sector wages
before joining than members of the runner-up party hired for similar occupations. For the
other occupational categories we find no significant differences. A similar pattern is visible
for wage residuals (Panel C), with members of the winning party hired in senior positions
having higher residuals than members of the runner-up party hired in similar positions.69
A potential concern about these results is that high quality members of the opposition
party might be less willing to work for the party in power. As a result, only lower quality
members of the runner-up party may be included in our analysis, leading us to overestimate
the effect of winning office on the quality of members of the winning party. To address this
concern, we compared the characteristics of members of the runner-up party hired from the
private sector in the three years before the start of the mayoral term and in the following
four years (e.g., the whole duration of the mayoral term). We found no significant change
after the elections, suggesting that a reduction in the quality of members of the runner-up
66We also conducted these analyses using a local linear regression considering alternative bandwidths (5%,
2.5%, and 1%) and obtained similar results.
67Note that the number of observations in Table 6 is significantly lower than that in Table 5, as we can
only estimate our measures of quality for those municipalities that hired members of both the winning and
runner-parties from the private sector for a particular occupation during the mayoral term.
68As an alternative to using this linear measure of education, we also estimated these regressions using
as dependent variables, alternatively, the fraction of members of the winning and runner-up parties that
completed high school and the fraction that completed college, and obtained similar results.
69We also estimated these regressions using as dependent variables the deciles of the wages and wage
residuals, alternatively, and obtained similar results.
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party hired by the municipal government does not account for our results.
Overall, these results show that, contrary to the common perception that discretionary
appointments lead to the selection of unqualified appointees, the discretionary hiring of mem-
bers of the winning party is no resulting in the selection of lower quality appointees. Our
findings also suggest that elected officials may be using their discretionary powers to appoint
high quality party members to senior positions, consistent with the idea that politicians value
both loyalty and expertise when appointing senior bureaucrats.
7 RDD in Close Races Within Municipality - Difference-
in-Difference Analysis
All the results presented above focus on the average effect of winning an election on the
employment of members of the winning party over the four years of the mayoral term. In
this section we exploit the time series dimension of our data to analyze whether this effect
varies over time during the mayoral term. To do this, we extend our main empirical approach
to a difference-in-difference framework using annual data, as described above.
7.1 Main Results
Table 7 presents our main estimates of the impact of wining office on the employment of
members of the winning party in the municipal bureaucracy using our RDD difference-in-
difference approach. In particular, this table shows the results of estimates following equation
(E.5), using a second-order polynomial in the margin of victory.70,71 For each municipality
and term, we have seven annual observations, including three years before the beginning of
the term and the four years of the term, and we have two observations in each year, one for
party members belonging to the winning local electoral coalition and one for party members
of the runner-up coalition. The dependent variable in column (1) is (the log of one plus) the
number of party members of each coalition working in the municipal public sector at any
point during a given year. The dependent variable in column (2) is the ratio of the number of
party members of each coalition employed in the municipal public sector to total municipal
public sector workers in each year. Column (3) reports results for (the log of one plus )
70We only report the results for the coefficients that measure the difference between the winning and the
runner-up coalition in each year of the mayoral term (i.e., γˆ1, γˆ2, γˆ3, and γˆ4 in equation (E.5)).
71We also conducted these analyses using a local linear regression considering different bandwidths (5%,
2.5%, and 1%) and obtained similar results.
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the number of party members hired in the municipal public sector in a given year, while
column (4) displays results for this variable scaled by total workers hired in the municipal
public sector in the same year. Finally, the dependent variable in column (5) is the annual
separation rate of members of the winning and the runner-up coalitions.72
The results in Table 7 show that winning a mayoral election has a positive and significant
effect on the employment of members of the winning party in the municipal public sector,
and that a large part of this increase occurs in the first year of the term. In particular, the
results in column (1) show that employment of members of the winning party increases by
29% (relative to members of the runner-up party before the start of the term) in the first
year of the mayoral term, and continues increasing throughout the term, albeit at a lower
pace. By the end of the term, the public sector employment of members of the winning
party is about 48% higher than the employment of members of the runner-up party in the
same municipality and term. This represents about 19 additional jobs for members of the
winning party. Similar patterns are visible when considering the share total municipal public
sector employees accounted for by members of the winning party (column (2)). Consistent
with these results, column (3) shows that number of members of the winning coalition hired
increases by 88% during the first year of the term. The hiring of members of the winning
party decreases in subsequent years, but remains higher than that of members of the runner-
up party throughout the mayoral term. Similar patterns are visible if we scale this variable
by the total number of workers hired in the municipal public sector in each year (column
(4)). Finally, the results in column (5) show that members of the runner-up party are more
likely to leave the municipal public sector in the first year of the mayoral term. This could
be the result of some form of punishment of members of the opposition by newly elected
mayors, or could reflect that members of the opposition party might be less willing to work
for the winning party. In any case, his effect is relatively small and most of the relative
increase in the number of members of the winning party employed in the municipal pubic
sector is mostly accounted for by the hiring of winning party members. We also find that
72As mentioned above, we have data on 5,364 municipalities for the term 2005-2008 and 5,272 munici-
palities for the term 2009-2012. For each municipality and term, we use seven annual observations (three
years before and the four years of the term) and we have two observations per year (one for members of
the winning coalition and one for members of the runner-up coalition). This results in a maximum 148,904
possible observations for these regressions. We lose less than 0.5% of the observations due to missing data,
which leaves us with 148,264 observations in columns (1) and (2) of Table 10. To identify the workers that
were hired by the municipal public sector or that left this sector in year t, we need information on whether
workers were working for the municipal public sector in year t-1. This implies that we cannot calculate the
number of hires nor the number of separations for 2002, as this is the first year in our sample. As a result,
for the term 2005-2008 the sample when analyzing hires (columns (3) and (4)) and separations (column (5))
has fewer observations.
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the separation rate of members of the winning party increases significantly in the last year
of the term, suggesting that many of the newly hired party members may leave at the end
of the mayoral term.73 We further explore what happens after the end of the mayoral term
in Section 7.2 below.
Figure 7 illustrates the results from Table 7, plotting the estimated coefficients from
equation (E.6), as well as the 95 percent confidence intervals for these coefficients, using (the
log of one plus) the number of party members of each coalition working in the municipal
public sector in a given year as dependent variable. The results show that there are no
significant differences in the number of party members of the winning and runner-up parties
working in the municipal public sector before the start of the mayoral term in close elections,
consistent with the balance tests described above. But once the winning party takes office,
the number of its members employed in the municipal bureaucracy increases significantly in
the first year of the term and remains higher than that of members of the runner-up party
throughout the term.
7.2 Are Effects Long-lasting?
All the results presented above focus on the effects of winning office on the employment
of party members during the mayoral term. A relevant question is whether these effects
extend beyond the end of the mayoral term. That is, are mayors able to grant relatively
permanent (i.e., lasting more than one mayoral term) jobs in the municipal public sector to
members of their political party? To what extent does this depend on the continuing electoral
success of the party? These are important questions as the value of jobs as a mechanism
to reward and motivate party members depends on the potential duration of these jobs and
on the extent to which these jobs might be tied to the subsequent electoral performance of
the party. Moreover, appointing party members to permanent jobs, particularly in senior
positions, might be a way for the party to ensure that it keeps influencing policy even after
leaving office. The results on the separation rate reported in Table 10 show that in the
last year of the mayoral term members of the party in power are more likely to leave the
municipal bureaucracy, suggesting that at least some of the jobs granted to party members
73Note that the dependent variable in column (1) is the number of party members that work in the
municipal public sector at any point during a given year. In particular, if a given party member is working
for the municipal administration in the last year of the term, but leaves her job at some point during that
year, she will show up as having worked for the municipal public sector in that year and will also be registered
as a separation in the same year. This explains why, although we observe an increase in the separation rate
at the end of the mayoral term, we do not see a decrease in the number of party member that have worked
for the municipal public sector in the same year.
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may not be long-lasting. In this section we explore this issue in more detail, using our RDD
difference-in-difference framework and extending it to include three years after the end of
the mayoral term.74 Given that our sample covers the period 2002-2013 we can only conduct
this analysis for the mayoral term 2005-2008. For brevity, in this Section we present all the
results in graphical form, following equation (E.6).
Figure 8 shows the long-term effects of winning office on the employment of party mem-
bers. In particular, it displays the results of estimating equation (E.6) for the mayoral term
2000-2008, including three years after the end of the term, using as dependent variable (the
log of one plus) the number of members of the winning/runner-up parties employed in the
municipal public sector in each year. Consistent with the patterns presented in Figure 7, the
number of members of the winning party employed in the municipal public sector increases
after the party wins an election and remains higher than that of members of the runner-up
party throughout the mayoral term. Moreover, the results in Figure 8 show that the effect
of winning an election on the employment of members of the winning party extends beyond
the end of the mayoral term. In particular, although the number of members of the winning
party employed in the municipal bureaucracy decreases somewhat at the end of the mayoral
term, even three years afterwards it remains more than 40% higher than before the party
took power.
A relevant question regarding the results in Figure 8 is to what extent the long-term effects
that we find are linked to parties’ electoral performance. That is, are these effects driven by
parties that are re-elected after the end of the mayoral term? Or does the employment of
members of the winning party remain high even if their party leaves office at the end of the
mayoral term? To address this issue, we split our sample of municipalities based on whether
the party in power is re-elected at the end of the mayoral term or not, and estimate our
regressions separately for these two samples. It is worth stressing that while this analysis
provides relevant evidence, the difference between the two samples does not have a casual
interpretation.
Figure 9 reports the results of these estimations. In particular, the X’s show the coefficient
estimates of equation(E.6) for the sample of municipalities where the party in office is re-
elected at the end of the mayoral term and the circles show the coefficients estimates for
those municipalities where the party leaves office at the end of the mayoral term. We find
that the employment of party members in the municipal public sector is tied to their parties’
74So for each municipality we have ten annual observations: three years before the beginning of the term,
the four years of the term, and three years after the end of the term. We have two observations per year, one
for members of the winning party and one for members of the runner-up party.
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subsequent electoral success. In particular, the number of members of the winning party
working in the municipal public sector remains relatively stable after the end of the mayoral
term for those parties that stay in power for a subsequent term, but decreases significantly in
the case of parties that leave office at the end of the term. However, even when parties leave
office, we find evidence of long-lasting effects, as the number of members of these parties
employed in the municipal bureaucracy is more than 20% higher three years after the end
of the term than before the party took power. This suggests that parties are able to grant
permanent positions in the municipal bureaucracy to their supporters and thus discretionary
appointments can have long-lasting effects.
As mentioned above, appointing party members to permanent jobs could be a way for
parties to retain their influence on the policy-making process after leaving office, particularly
if the permanent jobs are in senior positions. To analyse whether this could account for
our findings, we estimated our regressions on the sample of parties that are not re-elected
at the end of the term differentiating between senior officials and managers and all other
occupational categories.75 These results are presented in Figure 10. In particular, the X’s
show the coefficient estimates of equation (E.6) using as dependent variable (the log of one
plus) the number of members of the winning/runner-up parties employed as senior officials
and managers, and the circles show the coefficients estimates considering the number of
members of each party working in all other occupational categories.76 Our results show that
the long-lasting effects that we find are concentrated in non-senior positions. In particular,
when parties are not re-elected at the end of the term, the number of their members employed
in senior positions decreases significantly and is similar to its level before the party was elected
in the first place. On the other hand, the number of members of the winning party working in
non-senior positions in the municipal bureaucracy decreases somewhat after the party leaves
office, but is more than 20% higher after the end of the term than before the party took
power seven years before. This pattern is consistent with the idea that senior officials and
managers help align bureaucrat’s actions with the interests of elected politicians in order to
support their policy initiatives and, as a result, employment in these positions is directly
tied to politicians’ electoral success. However, it runs contrary to the idea that parties might
use permanent appointments in senior positions to continue to influence policies after leaving
75We also analyzed separately the different occupational categories and found broadly similar results.
76Note that the coefficients graphed in Figure 10 capture (percentage) differences relative to the year before
the start of the term for each of the employment categories. The number of members of the winning party
working in non-senior positions in the municipal public sector is actually higher than the number employed
in senior positions, but the later figure experiences a larger (percentage) increase (relative to its level in the
electoral year) after the party takes office.
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office. Our findings suggests that mayors are able to grant permanent jobs to members of their
parties in lower-ranked positions, which is more likely to reflect the objective of rewarding
or motivating party loyalists. These permanent jobs in non-senior positions are most likely
to be subject to formal civil service requirements, suggesting that mayors might be able to
8 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze whether elected officials allocate jobs in the public sector to members
of their own political party and how this affects the selection of government workers. Exploit-
ing close mayoral races, we estimate the causal effect of winning office on the employment of
members of the ruling party in the municipal bureaucracy. We find that indeed politicians
tend to use discretionary appointments to favor members of their parties: Winning a mayoral
election leads to an increase in the number of members of the winning party employed by
the municipal public sector of 35% to 41%.
We also present evidence on the possible reasons why elected officials hire members of
their own party, exploiting differences across occupations within the bureaucracy. We find
that winning a mayoral election has a positive and significant effect on the employment of
members of the winning party both in senior positions and in lower-ranked occupations,
suggesting that discretionary appointments to public sector jobs are used by mayors both to
control the management of public policies and to reward and motivate their supporters.
We also find that the quality of members of the winning party hired after the party takes
office is similar to that of members of the runner-up party for most occupations, except for
senior officials and managers. For these senior positions, we actually find that members of
the winning party tend to have higher private sector wages and wage residuals before joining
the public sector.
Overall, our results suggest that discretionary appointments are quite common and rep-
resent a non-negligible fraction of public sector workers, despite the existence of a quite
extensive formal civil service in Brazil. We also find that mayors use these appointments
for a variety of reasons, and not only as a patronage tool. Moreover, contrary to common
stereotypes, our results suggests that mayors use their discretionary powers to appoint high
quality party members to senior positions. This is consistent with the idea that politicians
value both loyalty and expertise when appointing senior bureaucrats.
Given the existing evidence on the negative effects of discretionary appointments in other
settings, it would be important to understand why in some cases political discretion over
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personnel decisions leads to extensive patronage and the hiring of lower quality appointees,
while in others elected officials seem to use this power to hire qualified workers. Which in-
stitutional, economic, or cultural factors might account for these differences? Even within
Brazil, are there any differences across municipalities in the way discretionary appointments
are used? And from a policy perspective, how can ensure that office holders use any discre-
tionary powers in a judicious manner?
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1 Figures
Figure 1: Party Membership in Brazil
Figure 1.1: Evolution of party membership
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of party members across municipalities
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Notes. Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of political party members as a share of the elec-
torate over the period 1997-2013. Figure 1.2 shows the histogram of this variable across
municipalities in 2013.
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Figure 2: Municipal Public Sector Employment in Brazil
Figure 2.1: Evolution of municipal public sector employment
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Figure 2.2: Evolution of municipal public sector employment -
share of formal sector workers
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Notes. Figure 2.1 shows the number of employees working in the municipal public sector
averaged across the municipalities in our sample for the period 2002-2013. Figure 2.2 shows
the number of employees working in the municipal public sector over the total formal sector
workers, averaged across the municipalities in our sample for the period 2002-2013.
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Figure 3: Effect of Winning a Mayoral Election on Employment of Party Members
in the Municipal Public Sector
Figure 3.1: Party members employed in the municipal public sector
Figure 3.2: Party members as a share of total municipal public sector employees
Notes. This figure illustrates the RDD estimates following equation (E.3), fitting a 2nd order polynomial in MV in
both sides of the threshold MV = 0 for the outcome variables analysed in Table 3. Figure 3.1 dependent variable
is (the log of one plus) the annual number of party members employed in the municipal public sector averaged over
the mayoral term. Figure 3.2 dependent variable is the number of party members employed by municipal public
sector over total municipal employees, averaged over the mayoral term.The variable on the x-axis is the margin of
victory, and observations are averaged within bins of two percent of margin of victory. We plot the average of our
dependent variables for party members belonging to the winning coalition (to the right of the cutoff MV = 0) and
for party members belonging to the runner-up coalition (to the left of the cutoff MV = 0). The solid line is a split
second-order polynomial in MV fitted separately on each side of the MV threshold at zero. The dotted lines are the
95 percent confidence interval of the polynomial.
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Figure 4: Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members
in the Municipal Public Sector - Hires and Separations
Figure 4.1: Party members hired
Figure 4.2: Party members hired as a share of total hires
Figure 4.3: Separation rate
Notes. This figure illustrates the RDD estimates following equation (E.3), fitting a 2nd order polynomial in MV in both
sides of the threshold MV = 0 for the outcome variables analysed in Table 4. The dependent variable in Figure 4.1 is (the
log of one plus) the total number of party members hired by the municipal public sector over the whole mayoral term. Figure
4.2 dependent variable is the number of party members hired in municipal public sector over total hires in the municipal
public sector over the whole mayoral term. Figure 4.3 dependent variable is the annual separation rate, averaged over the
mayoral term. The variable on the x-axis is the margin of victory, and observations are averaged within bins of two percent
of margin of victory. We plot the average of our dependent variables for party members belonging to the winning coalition
(to the right of the cutoff MV = 0) and for party members belonging to the runner-up coalition (to the left of the cutoff
MV = 0). The blue line is a split second-order polynomial in MV fitted separately on each side of the MV threshold at
zero. The green lines are the 95 percent confidence interval of the polynomial.
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Figure 5: Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members
in the Municipal Public Sector - Occupation Categories - Employment Levels
Notes. This figure shows different regressions for each occupation category. The graphs illustrates the RDD estimates
following equation (E.3), fitting a 2nd order polynomial in MV in both sides of the threshold MV = 0 for the
outcome variable analysed in Table 5, panel A. The variable on the x-axis is the margin of victory, and observations
are averaged within bins of two percent of margin of victory. We plot the average of our dependent variables for
party members belonging to the winning coalition (to the right of the cutoff MV = 0) and for party members
belonging to the runner-up coalition (to the left of the cutoff MV = 0). The solid line is a split second-order
polynomial in MV fitted separately on each side of the MV threshold at zero. The dotted lines are the 95 percent
confidence interval of the polynomial.
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Figure 6: Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members in the Municipal Public Sector -
Occupation Categories - Share of Employment in Each Occupation Category
Notes. This figure shows different regressions for each occupation category. The graphs illustrates the RDD estimates
following equation (E.3), fitting a 2nd order polynomial in MV in both sides of the thresholdMV = 0 for the outcome
variables analysed in Table 5, panel B, for each occupation category. The variable on the x-axis is the margin of
victory, and observations are averaged within bins of two percent of margin of victory. We plot the average of our
dependent variables for party members belonging to the winning coalition (to the right of the cutoff MV = 0) and
for party members belonging to the runner-up coalition (to the left of the cutoff MV = 0). The solid line is a split
second-order polynomial in MV fitted separately on each side of the MV threshold at zero. The dotted lines are the
95 percent confidence interval of the polynomial.
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Figure 7: Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members
in the Municipal Public Sector - RDD Diff-in-Diff estimates
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Notes. This figure shows RDD estimates following equation (E.6), The horizontal axis denotes
the years since elections. The dots show the coefficient estimates and the lines the 95 percent
confidence intervals. The dependent variable is (the log of one plus) the annual number of
party members employed in the municipal public sector. Sample includes only the coalition
of the winning mayoral candidate and the coalition of the runner-up candidate. Sample
includes mayoral terms 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. For each mayoral term, we use seven
annual observations, including three years before the beginning of the term, and the four
years of the term.
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Figure 8: Long Term Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members
in the Municipal Public Sector- RDD Diff-in-Diff estimates
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Notes. This figure shows RDD estimates following equation (E.6). The horizontal axis
denotes the years since elections. Sample includes only the coalition of the winning mayoral
candidate and the coalition of the runner-up candidate. Sample includes mayoral term 2005-
2008 where neither the winner nor the runner-up are in power at the time of elections. We
use ten annual observations, including three years before the beginning of the term, the
four years of the term, and three years after the term. The dotted lines are the 95 percent
confidence interval of the polynomial. The dots show the coefficient estimates and the lines
the 95 percent confidence intervals. The dependent variable is (the log of one plus) the annual
number of party members employed in the municipal public sector. Observations are at the
municipality, electoral coalition, and term-period level.
59
Figure 9: Long Term Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members
in the Municipal Public Sector - Difference between Parties that Remain in Power and Parties that
Leave
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Notes. This figure shows RDD estimates following equation (E.6). The horizontal axis
denotes the years since elections. Sample includes only the coalition of the winning mayoral
candidate and the coalition of the runner-up candidate. Sample includes mayoral term 2005-
2008 where neither the winner nor the runner-up are in power at the time of elections. We
use ten annual observations, including three years before the beginning of the term, the
four years of the term, and three years after the term. The X marks show the coefficient
estimates for the sample of municipalities where the party remain in power in the subsequent
mayoral term. The circles show the coefficient estimates for the sample of municipalities
where the party does not remain in power in the subsequent term. The lines represent 95
percent confidence intervals. The dependent variable is (the log of one plus) the annual
number of party members employed in the municipal public sector. Observations are at the
municipality, electoral coalition, and term-period level.
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Figure 10: Long Term Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members in the Municipal
Public Sector - Parties that Leave Power - Difference across Occupations
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Notes. This figure shows RDD estimates following equation (E.6). The horizontal axis
denotes the years since elections. Sample includes only the coalition of the winning mayoral
candidate and the coalition of the runner-up candidate. Sample includes mayoral term 2005-
2008 where neither the winner nor the runner-up are in power at the time of elections. We
use ten annual observations, including three years before the beginning of the term, the four
years of the term, and three years after the term. The X marks show the coefficient estimates
for the sample of senior officials and managers. The circles show the coefficient estimates
for all employment categories, excluding senior officials and managers. The lines represent
95 percent confidence intervals. The dependent variable is (the log of one plus) the annual
number of party members employed in the municipal public sector. Observations are at the
municipality, electoral coalition, and term-period level.
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2 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics - Individual Level Characteristics
(1) (2)
Never political party
members (between
2002-2013)
Political party members
at some point (between
2002-2013)
Panel A: All sample
Number of workers 84,903,254 5,558,232
Number of job-year observations 599,100,000 52,292,522
Share that worked in the public sector
at some point between 2002-2013 17.1% 41.9%
Share that only worked in the public
sector between 2002-2013 7.1% 16.1%
Panel B: Municipal public sector employees
Age 39.79 42.56
Share female 0.682 0.484
Share white 0.542 0.539
Years of schooling 12.35 11.76
Wage (ln) 6.809 6.766
Wage residuals -0.012 0.037
Note. This table shows descriptive statistics for our matched individual-level data on employment and party
membership. Column (1) considers workers who are never affiliated with a political party during the sample
period. Column (2) considers workers who are members of a political party at some point during our sample pe-
riod. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for all the workers in our data. Panel B compares the characteristics
of party members and non-party members working in the municipal public sector.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics - Municipal Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Municipalities Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median
1st
percentile
99th
percentile
Panel A: All municipal public sector employees
Total number of employees 5,532 10,636 978.4 3,121.7 434.5 87.0 9,157.3
Total number of hires 5,532 10,636 644.0 2,362.8 267.0 24.0 6,701.0
Separation rate 5,505 10,484 0.118 0.058 0.110 0.017 0.285
Panel B: Party members employed in the municipal public sector - Winning coalition
Total number of employees 5,532 10,636 66.1 117.6 39.3 1.3 536.3
Share of total employment 5,532 10,636 0.098 0.067 0.085 0.004 0.306
Total number of hires 5,532 10,636 30.8 63.2 16.0 0.0 264.0
Share of total hires 5,532 10,636 0.068 0.050 0.057 0.000 0.227
Separation rate 5,505 10,484 0.103 0.065 0.091 0.000 0.303
Panel C: Party members employed in the municipal public sector - Runner-up coalition
Total number of employees 5,532 10,636 42.4 96.3 23.5 0.0 352.0
Share of total employment 5,532 10,636 0.061 0.049 0.050 0.000 0.225
Total number of hires 5,532 10,636 17.4 68.9 7.0 0.0 171.0
Share of total hires 5,532 10,636 0.033 0.031 0.026 0.000 0.147
Separation rate 5,505 10,484 0.093 0.072 0.080 0.000 0.327
Notes. This table presents descriptive statistics for the main measures of employment in the municipal public sector used in our
empirical analysis. Panel A shows statistics for all municipal public sector workers. Panels B and C display statistics for party
members employed in the municipal public sector that belong to the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate or the coalition of
the runner-up mayoral candidate, respectively.
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Table 3: Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members in the
Municipal Public Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS
2nd order
polynomial
Local linear regression
CCT 5% 2.5% 1%
Panel A: Number of party members employed by municipal public sector (log)
Winner coalition 0.507*** 0.329*** 0.337*** 0.345*** 0.297*** 0.327***
(0.010) (0.017) (0.024) (0.035) (0.050) (0.083)
Observations 21,272 21,272 11,134 5,454 2,694 1,070
No. municipalities 5,532 5,532 4,080 2,352 1,259 523
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up coalition 42.4 42.4 41.6 39.7 39.5 38.7
Bandwidth 0.113 0.050 0.025 0.010
Panel B: Party members employed by municipal public sector over total municipal employees
Winner coalition 0.036*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Observations 21,272 21,272 12,785 5,454 2,694 1,070
No. municipalities 5,532 5,532 4,439 2,352 1,259 523
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up coalition 0.061 0.061 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.067
Bandwidth 0.137 0.050 0.025 0.010
Notes. This table analyzes the effect of winning a mayoral election on the number of party members employed in the
municipal public sector. Observations are at the municipality, electoral coalition, and term level. Sample includes mayoral
terms 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. Sample includes only the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and the coalition of
the runner-up candidate. Panel A dependent variable is (the log of one plus) the annual number of party members employed
in the municipal public sector averaged over the mayoral term. Panel B dependent variable is the number of party members
employed in municipal public sector over total municipal employees, averaged over the mayoral term. Winner coalition
is a dummy variable that equals one for the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and zero for the coalition of the
runner-up candidate. Column (1) displays OLS estimates, following equation (E.2). Column (2) displays RDD estimates
following equation (E.3), fitting a 2nd order polynomial on MV in both sides of the threshold MV = 0. Columns (3)
to (6) present local linear regression estimates, based on equation (E.4) and considering alternative bandwidths: optimal
bandwidth calculated following Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) (column (3)), considering observations with margin
of victory in the intervals [-0.025;+0.025] (column 4), [-0.025;+0.025] (column (5), and [-0.010;+0.010] (column (6)). Mean
dep. var - runner-up coalition is the mean of the dependent variable for party members of the coalition of the runner-
up candidate (without taking logs). All regressions include term, municipality, and party-term fixed effects. *, ** and
*** denote significance at ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the
municipality level.
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Table 4: Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members in the
Municipal Public Sector - Hires and Separations
(1) (2) (3)
Total party members
hired over the whole term Separation rate
(annual avg.)
Log
Share of
total hires
Panel A: RDD estimates using a second order spline polynomial specification
Winner coalition 0.561*** 0.030*** 0.012***
(0.016) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 21,272 21,272 20,968
No. municipalities 5,532 5,532 5,505
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up coalition 17.4 0.033 0.093
Panel B: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.025;+0.025]
Winner coalition 0.514*** 0.026*** 0.015***
(0.046) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 2,694 2,694 2,668
No. municipalities 1,259 1,259 1,248
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up coalition 16.7 0.037 0.096
Panel C: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.010; +0.010]
Winner coalition 0.589*** 0.030*** 0.016**
(0.077) (0.004) (0.006)
Observations 1,070 1,070 1,060
No. municipalities 523 523 518
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up coalition 16.3 0.036 0.093
Notes. This table analyzes the effect of winning a mayoral election on additional measures of employment
of party members in the municipal public sector. Observations are at the municipality, electoral coalition,
and term level. Sample includes mayoral terms 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. Sample includes only the coali-
tion of the winning mayoral candidate and the coalition of the runner-up candidate. Panel A reports RDD
estimates following equation (E.3), fitting a 2nd order polynomial on MV in both sides of the threshold
MV = 0. Panel B and C present local linear regression estimates, based on equation (E.4) and considering
alternative bandwidths with margin of victory in the intervals [-0.025;+0.025], and [-0.010;+0.010], respec-
tively.f Winner coalition is a dummy variable that equals one for the coalition of the winning mayoral
candidate and zero for the coalition of the runner-up candidate. Mean dep. var - runner-up coalition is the
mean of the dependent variable for party members of the coalition of the runner-up candidate (without
taking logs). All regressions include term, municipality, and party-term fixed effects. *, ** and *** denote
significance at ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the
municipality level.
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Table 5: Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members in the
Municipal Administration - Occupational Categories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Senior officials and managers
Professionals
Mid-level
technicians
clerks
Blue collar
workers
All
Senior public
administration
officials
Panel A: Party members employed in municipality by job category (in logs)
Winner coalition 0.638*** 0.514*** 0.203*** 0.171*** 0.267*** 0.174***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 21,272 21,272 21,272 21,272 21,272 21,272
Municipalities 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up 3.4 2.7 7.0 6.5 19.0 6.3
Panel B: Party members employed in municipality by job category (share of job category)
Winner coalition 0.119*** 0.122*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 20,624 19,660 21,100 20,962 21,248 20,788
Municipalities 5,451 5,314 5,515 5,491 5,530 5,466
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up 0.052 0.047 0.044 0.056 0.066 0.103
Notes. This table analyzes the effect of winning a mayoral election on employment of party members in the municipal public
sector, by job catgories. Observations are at the municipality and level. Sample includes mayoral terms 2005-2008 and
2009-2012. Panel A shows results for (the log of one plus) the number of members of the winning or runner-up coalitions
employed in each occupation in each year, averaged over the mayoral term. Panel B shows results when the dependent
variable is the ratio of the number of party members of each coalition employed in a given occupation to the total number of
municipal workers in that occupation, averaged over the mayoral term. Each column presents results for a given occupational
category. Winner coalition is a dummy variable that equals one for the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and zero
for the coalition of the runner-up candidate. Mean dep. var - runner-up coalition is the mean of the dependent variable for
party members of the coalition of the runner-up candidate (without taking logs). All regressions include term, municipality,
and party-term fixed effects. *, ** and *** denote significance at ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. Standard
errors in parenthesis clustered at the municipality level.
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Table 6: Effects of Winning Office on the Quality of Party Members’ Hired
in the Municipal Public Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Senior officials and managers
Professionals
Mid-level
technicians
Clerks
Blue collar
workersAll
Senior public
administration
officials
Panel A: Years of schooling
Winner coalition -0.003 -0.004 -0.009 0.012 0.008 -0.007
(0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014)
Observations 1,842 1,428 1,610 1,912 4,944 2,005
No. municipalities 743 571 627 759 1,825 852
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up coalition 13.0 12.9 15.0 13.1 11.7 10.8
Panel B: Previous wage in the private sector
Winner coalition 0.079** 0.088** 0.028 0.000 0.016 -0.034
(0.036) (0.040) (0.039) (0.026) (0.016) (0.022)
Observations 1,944 1,506 1,672 1,966 5,260 2,215
No. municipalities 779 598 652 775 1,934 938
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up coalition 896.6 865.0 895.3 668.1 664.0 730.4
Panel C: Previous residual in the private sector
Winner coalition 0.048* 0.048* 0.003 0.001 0.026* 0.013
(0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.021) (0.014) (0.019)
Observations 1,824 1,416 1,594 1,900 4,906 1,990
No. municipalities 735 566 621 754 1,814 846
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up coalition -0.123 -0.121 -0.203 -0.166 -0.179 -0.123
Notes. This table analyzes the effect of winning a mayoral election on the quality of party members employed in municipal
public sector. Observations are at the municipality, coalition, and term level. Sample includes mayoral terms 2005-2008
and 2009-2012. Sample includes only the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and the coalition of the runner-
up candidate. Sample considers only workers hired by the municipal public sector during the mayoral term who were
previously employed in the private sector. This table reports the results for different dependent variable considering several
occupational categories. Table reports RDD estimates following equation (E.3). Winner coalition is a dummy variable
that equals one for the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and zero for the coalition of the runner-up candidate.
Mean dep. var - runner-up coalition is the mean of the dependent variable for party members of the coalition of the
runner-up candidate (without taking logs). All regressions include term, municipality, and party-term fixed effects. *, **
and *** denote significance at ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the
municipality level.
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Table 7: Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members in the
Municipal Public Sector - RDD Diff-in-Diff estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Party members employed
by municipal public sector
Total party members
hired Separation rate
(annual avg.)
Log
Share of total
municipal
employees
Log
Share of total
municipal
hires
Winner coalition × Year 1 0.253*** 0.020*** 0.629*** 0.051*** -0.023***
(0.009) (0.001) (0.017) (0.002) (0.003)
Winner coalition × Year 2 0.313*** 0.024*** 0.309*** 0.025*** 0.021***
(0.011) (0.001) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002)
Winner coalition × Year 3 0.319*** 0.024*** 0.206*** 0.012*** 0.027***
(0.011) (0.001) (0.016) (0.001) (0.002)
Winner coalition × Year 4 0.389*** 0.031*** 0.224*** 0.016*** 0.073***
(0.014) (0.001) (0.016) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 148,264 148,264 137,744 136,016 132,512
No. municipalities 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,505
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up coal. before term 40.4 0.071 4.5 0.047 0.075
Notes. This table analyzes whether the employment of party members in the municipal public sector increases in the years
after the party wins a mayoral election (relative to members of the runner-up party). Observations are at the municipality,
coalition, and year level. Sample includes only the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and the coalition of the
runner-up candidate. Sample includes mayoral terms 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. For each mayoral term, we use seven
annual observations, including three years before the beginning of the term and the four years of the term. The table
reports results of RDD estimates following equation (E.5), fitting a 2nd order polynomial in MV in both sides of the
threshold MV = 0. All regressions include term-period, municipality, and party-term fixed effects. Winner coalition is a
dummy variable that equals one for the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and zero for the coalition of the runner-
up candidate. Winner coalition x Y ear t = (1, 2, 3, 4) are interactions between the dummy variable Winnercoalition and
different dummy variable for each of the mayoral term. Mean dep. var - runner-up coal. before term is the mean of the
dependent variable for party members of the coalition of the runner-up candidate in the years before the mayoral term
(without taking logs). *, ** and *** denote significance at ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. Standard errors in
parenthesis clustered at the municipality level.
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Figure 1A: Local Linear Regression Estimates of the Effect of Winning a Mayoral Election
on Employment of Party Members in the Municipal Public Sector
Figure 1A.1: Party members employed in the municipal public sector
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Figure 1A.2: Party members as a share of total municipal
public sector employees
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Notes. The figures display RDD local linear regression estimates following equation (E.4) as a function of the
bandwidth chosen for different dependent variables. We estimate 50 separate regressions for bandwidths of varying
size from 0.005 to 0.25, considering increments of 0.005. The dots show the coefficient estimates and the lines the 95
percent confidence intervals. The dependent variable in Figure 1A.1 is (the log of one plus) the annual number of
party members employed in the municipal public sector averaged over the mayoral term. The dependent variable in
Figure 1A.2 is the number of party members employed by municipal public sector over total municipal employees,
averaged over the mayoral term.
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Table A.1: Distribution of Party Members Across Parties
2004 2008 2012
Partido do Movimento Democra´tico Brasileiro (PMDB) 0.176 0.166 0.156
Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) 0.084 0.092 0.103
Partido Progressista (PP) 0.112 0.102 0.094
Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) 0.094 0.096 0.090
Democratas (DEM) 0.090 0.080 0.073
Partido Democra´tico Trabalhista (PDT) 0.084 0.082 0.080
Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) 0.087 0.083 0.078
Partido da Repu´blica (PR) 0.062 0.058 0.051
Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB) 0.030 0.033 0.038
Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) 0.035 0.033 0.031
Others 0.148 0.176 0.207
Note. This table shows the evolution of the share of party members for the main political parties in Brazil. *DEM
(Democratas) was originated in 2007 from the PFL (Partido da Frente Liberal). *PR (Partido Republicano) was
created in 2006, though the merge between PRONA and PL, so we sum up the share of affiliates for these two
parties in 2004.
2
Table A.2: Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members
in the Non-municipal Public Sector (i.e., Federal and State)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Party members employed
in the municipal public sector
Total party members hired
Separation
rate (annual
avg.)Log
Share of total
municipal
employees
Log
Share of total
municipal
hires
Panel A: RDD estimates using a second order spline polynomial specification
Winner coalition -0.001 -0.004 0.006 0.000 -0.001
(0.010) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007)
Observations 20,098 20,098 20,098 18,302 6,995
No. municipalities 5,308 5,308 5,308 5,166 2,411
Mean dep. var.
-runner-up coalition 19.6 0.049 9.1 0.010 0.073
Panel B: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.025; +0.025]
Winner coalition 0.040 0.002 0.034 0.006* 0.016
(0.029) (0.010) (0.023) (0.003) (0.029)
Observations 2,530 2,530 2,530 2,316 530
No. municipalities 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,087 258
Mean dep. var
-runner-up coalition 4.8 0.051 0.2 0.010 0.090
Panel C: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.010; +0.010]
Winner coalition 0.050 0.011 0.014 0.005 0.021
(0.045) (0.016) (0.037) (0.005) (0.066)
Observations 1,012 1,012 1,012 932 228
No. municipalities 494 494 494 457 113
Mean dep. var.
-runner-up coalition 2.2 0.052 0.2 0.008 0.076
Notes. This table analyzes the effect of winning a mayoral election on other measures of employment of party members
in the federal or state public sector. Observations are at the municipality, electoral coalition, and term level. Sample
includes mayoral terms 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. Sample includes only the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate
and the coalition of the runner-up candidate. Panel A reports RDD estimates following equation (E.3), fitting a 2nd order
polynomial on MV in both sides of the threshold MV = 0. Panel B and C present local linear regression estimates, based
on equation (E.4) and considering alternative bandwidths with margin of victory in the intervals [-0.025;+0.025], and [-
0.010;+0.010], respectively. Winner coalition is a dummy variable that equals one for the coalition of the winning mayoral
candidate and zero for the coalition of the runner-up candidate. Mean dep. var - runner-up coalition is the mean of the
dependent variable for party members of the coalition of the runner-up candidate (without taking logs). All regressions
include term, municipality, and party-term fixed effects. *, ** and *** denote significance at ten, five, and one percent level,
respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the municipality level.
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Table A.3: Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members in the Private Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Party members employed
in the private sector
Total party members hired
in the private sector Separation
rate (annual
avg.)Log
Share of total
private sector
employees
Log
Share of total
private sector
hires
Panel A: RDD estimates using a second order spline polynomial specification
Winner coalition 0.007 -0.001 -0.013 -0.001* -0.002
(0.015) (0.001) (0.015) (0.000) (0.002)
Observations 21,214 21,214 21,214 21,190 20,118
No. municipalities 5,523 5,523 5,523 5,521 5,370
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up coalition 117.0 0.030 135.8 0.020 0.242
Panel B: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.025;+0.025]
Winner coalition -0.015 -0.001 -0.058 -0.001 0.002
(0.043) (0.002) (0.046) (0.001) (0.008)
Observations 2,690 2,690 2,690 2,688 2,524
No. municipalities 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,256 1,183
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up coalition 87.5 0.034 3.0 0.022 0.240
Panel C: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.010;+0.010]
Winner coalition 0.029 0.000 0.007 -0.000 0.001
(0.069) (0.003) (0.074) (0.003) (0.014)
Observations 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,004
No. municipalities 522 522 522 522 490
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up coalition 82.4 0.033 3.0 0.021 0.242
Notes. This table analyzes the effect of winning a mayoral election on other measures of employment of party members in the
municipal private sector. Observations are at the municipality, electoral coalition, and term level. Sample includes mayoral
terms 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. Sample includes only the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and the coalition of
the runner-up candidate. Panel A reports RDD estimates following equation (E.3), fitting a 2nd order polynomial on MV in
both sides of the threshold MV = 0. Panel B and C present local linear regression estimates, based on equation (E.4) and
considering alternative bandwidths with margin of victory in the intervals [-0.025;+0.025], and [-0.010;+0.010], respectively.
Winner coalition is a dummy variable that equals one for the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and zero for the
coalition of the runner-up candidate. Mean dep. var - runner-up coalition is the mean of the dependent variable for party
members of the coalition of the runner-up candidate (without taking logs). All regressions include term, municipality, and
party-term fixed effects. *, ** and *** denote significance at ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. Standard errors
in parenthesis clustered at the municipality level.
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Table A.4: Balance Test - Employment of Party Members in the Municipal Public Sector
in the Year Before the Start of the Mayoral Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Party members employed
in the municipal public sector
Total party members hired
Separation
rate (annual
avg.)Log
Share of total
municipal
employees
Log
Share of total
municipal
hires
Panel A: RDD estimates using a second order spline polynomial specification
Winner coalition 0.011 -0.000 0.020 0.001 -0.004
(0.020) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 21,272 21,272 21,272 19,430 20,488
No. municipalities 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,346 5,459
Panel B: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.050; +0.050]
Winner coalition -0.010 -0.001 0.060 0.002 -0.014*
(0.063) (0.006) (0.045) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 2,694 2,694 2,694 2,422 2,588
No. municipalities 1,259 1,259 1,259 1,144 1,209
Panel C: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.010; +0.010]
Winner coalition -0.042 -0.013 0.109 -0.008 -0.001
(0.102) (0.010) (0.071) (0.016) (0.008)
Observations 1,070 1,070 1,070 964 1,020
No. municipalities 523 523 523 471 498
Notes. This table reports balance tests for employment of party members in municipal public sector in the year before the
start of the mayoral term. Observations are at the municipality, electoral coalition, and term level. Sample includes mayoral
terms 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. Sample includes only the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and the coalition of
the runner-up candidate. Panel A reports RDD estimates following equation (E.3), fitting a 2nd order polynomial on MV in
both sides of the threshold MV = 0. Panel B and C present local linear regression estimates, based on equation (E.4) and
considering alternative bandwidths with margin of victory in the intervals [-0.025;+0.025], and [-0.010;+0.010], respectively.
Winner coalition is a dummy variable that equals one for the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and zero for the
coalition of the runner-up candidate. Mean dep. var - runner-up coalition is the mean of the dependent variable for party
members of the coalition of the runner-up candidate (without taking logs). All regressions include term, municipality, and
party-term fixed effects. *, ** and *** denote significance at ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. Standard errors
in parenthesis clustered at the municipality level.
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Table A.5: Balance Test - Characteristics of Party Members in the Year Before the Start of the Mayoral Mandate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Party members
Party members in
the formal sector
Female
(share)
White
(share)
Years of
schooling
(avg.)
Higher
education
degree
(share)
High
Skill
(share)
Low
Skill
(share)
Wage
Log Share Log Share Log Residual
Panel A: RDD estimates using a second order spline polynomial specification
Winner coalition 0.029* -0.000 0.017 -0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.022 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005
(0.016) (0.001) (0.017) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.022) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Observations 21,272 21,272 21,272 21,272 21,129 21,129 21,116 21,116 21,116 21,129 21,129 21,129
No. municipalities 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,520 5,520 5,518 5,518 5,518 5,520 5,520 5,520
Panel B: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.025;+0.025]
Winner coalition -0.025 -0.002 -0.006 -0.000 -0.017** -0.006 0.035 0.007 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.016
(0.048) (0.002) (0.055) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.067) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.015)
Observations 2,694 2,694 2,694 2,694 2,660 2,660 2,656 2,656 2,656 2,660 2,660 2,660
No. municipalities 1,259 1,259 1,259 1,259 1,243 1,243 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,243 1,243 1,243
Panel C: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.010;+0.010]
Winner coalition -0.027 -0.002 -0.078 -0.010 -0.013 -0.003 -0.178 -0.016 0.000 -0.011 0.005 -0.012
(0.084) (0.004) (0.092) (0.006) (0.014) (0.012) (0.130) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.024)
Observations 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054
No. municipalities 523 523 523 523 515 515 515 515 515 515 515 515
Notes. This table reports balance tests for characteristics of party members in the year before the start of the mayoral term. Observations are at the municipality, electoral coalition, and
term level. Sample includes mayoral terms 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. Sample includes only the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and the coalition of the runner-up candidate.
Panel A reports RDD estimates following equation (E.3), fitting a 2nd order polynomial on MV in both sides of the threshold MV = 0. Panel B and C present local linear regression
estimates, based on equation (E.4) and considering alternative bandwidths with margin of victory in the intervals [-0.025;+0.025], and [-0.010;+0.010], respectively. Winner coalition
is a dummy variable that equals one for the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and zero for the coalition of the runner-up candidate. Mean dep. var - runner-up coalition is the
mean of the dependent variable for party members of the coalition of the runner-up candidate (without taking logs). All regressions include term, municipality, and party-term fixed
effects. *, ** and *** denote significance at ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the municipality level.
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Table A.6: Balance Checks - Mayoral Candidate Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Age Female Married College Incumbent PT PMDB PSDB DEM
Panel A: RDD estimates using a second order spline polynomial specification
Winner coalition -0.081 -0.004 0.005 0.001 -0.010 0.011 -0.004 0.001 -0.005
(0.434) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Observations 21,269 21,272 21,272 21,272 21,272 21,272 21,272 21,272 21,272
No. municipalities 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532
Panel B: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.025; +0.025]
Winner coalition 2.710 -0.006 0.050* -0.043 -0.011 0.021 0.015 -0.025 -0.021
(2.639) (0.024) (0.030) (0.035) (0.036) (0.024) (0.028) (0.035) (0.028)
Observations 2,692 2,694 2,694 2,694 2,694 2,698 2,698 2,698 2,698
No. municipalities 1,258 1,259 1,259 1,259 1,259 1,261 1,261 1,261 1,261
Panel C: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.010; +0.010]
Winner coalition 5.051 0.036 0.030 -0.043 -0.101 0.051 -0.006 -0.101* -0.004
(3.911) (0.040) (0.048) (0.057) (0.061) (0.040) (0.046) (0.059) (0.045)
Observations 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,082 1,082 1,082 1,082
No. municipalities 523 523 523 523 523 527 527 527 527
Notes. This table reports balance checks for mayoral candidate characteristics. Observations are at the municipality, coalition, and term level. Observations are at the municipality,
electoral coalition, and term level. Sample includes elections held in 2004 and 2008. Sample includes only the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and the coalition of the
runner-up candidate. Panel A reports RDD estimates following equation (E.3), fitting a 2nd order polynomial on MV in both sides of the threshold MV = 0. Panel B and C present
local linear regression estimates, based on equation (E.4) and considering alternative bandwidths with margin of victory in the intervals [-0.025;+0.025], and [-0.010;+0.010], respectively.
Winner coalition is a dummy variable that equals one for the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and zero for the coalition of the runner-up candidate. Mean dep. var -
runner-up coalition is the mean of the dependent variable for party members of the coalition of the runner-up candidate (without taking logs). All regressions include term, municipality,
and party-term fixed effects. *, ** and *** denote significance at ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the municipality level.
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Table A.7: Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members in the Municipal Public Sector -
Considering only Two-candidate Races
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Party members employed
in the private sector
Total party members hired
in the private sector Separation
rate (annual
avg.)Log
Share of total
private sector
employees
Log
Share of total
private sector
hires
Panel A: RDD estimates using a second order spline polynomial specification
Winner coalition 0.325*** 0.028*** 0.596*** 0.037*** 0.011***
(0.024) (0.002) (0.022) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 10,976 10,976 10,976 10,976 10,770
No. municipalities 3,864 3,864 3,864 3,864 3,815
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up party 117.0 0.030 135.8 0.020 0.242
Panel B: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.025;+0.025]
Winner coalition 0.272*** 0.023*** 0.548*** 0.031*** 0.018***
(0.070) (0.007) (0.066) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 1,282 1,282 1,282 1,282 1,272
No. municipalities 614 614 614 614 610
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up party 34.5 0.080 2.1 0.041 0.094
Panel C: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.010;+0.010]
Winner coalition 0.249** 0.020* 0.768*** 0.043*** 0.021**
(0.117) (0.012) (0.113) (0.007) (0.009)
Observations 502 502 502 502 500
No. municipalities 248 248 248 248 247
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up party 33.2 0.080 2.0 0.039 0.090
Notes. This table analyzes the effect of winning a mayoral election employment of coalition members in the municipal
public sector. Observations are at the municipality, coalition, and term level. Sample includes mayoral terms 2005-2008 and
2009-2012. Sample includes only the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and the coalition of the runner-up candidate
for races with only two candidates. Panel A reports RDD estimates following equation (E.3), fitting a 2nd order polynomial
on MV in both sides of the threshold MV = 0. Panel B and C present local linear regression estimates, based on equation
(E.4) and considering alternative bandwidths with margin of victory in the intervals [-0.025;+0.025], and [-0.010;+0.010],
respectively. Winner coalition is a dummy variable that equals one for the party of the winning mayoral candidate and
zero for the party of the runner-up candidate. Mean dep. var - runner-up coalition is the mean of the dependent variable for
party members of the coalition of the runner-up candidate (without taking logs). All regressions include term, municipality,
and coalition-term fixed effects. *, ** and *** denote significance at ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. Standard
errors in parenthesis clustered at the municipality level.
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Table A.8: Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members in the Municipal Public Sector -
Considering only Members of the Leading Party in the Coalition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Party members employed
in the private sector
Total party members hired
in the private sector Separation
rate (annual
avg.)Log
Share of total
private sector
employees
Log
Share of total
private sector
hires
Panel A: RDD estimates using a second order spline polynomial specification
Winner party 0.390*** 0.014*** 0.589*** 0.017*** 0.012***
(0.018) (0.001) (0.017) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 21,272 21,272 21,272 21,272 20,013
No. municipalities 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,392
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up coalition 117.0 0.030 135.8 0.020 0.242
Panel B: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.025;+0.025]
Winner party 0.369*** 0.011*** 0.535*** 0.014*** 0.026***
(0.057) (0.003) (0.051) (0.002) (0.007)
Observations 2,694 2,694 2,694 2,694 2,452
No. municipalities 1,259 1,259 1,259 1,259 1,150
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up coalition 15.0 0.029 5.6 0.014 0.108
Panel C: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.010;+0.010]
Winner party 0.373*** 0.011** 0.572*** 0.015*** 0.016
(0.097) (0.004) (0.087) (0.003) (0.011)
Observations 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,070 956
No. municipalities 523 523 523 523 466
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up coalition 16.1 0.029 6.1 0.014 0.098
Notes. This table analyzes the effect of winning a mayoral election employment of party members in the municipal public
sector. Observations are at the municipality, party, and term level. Sample includes mayoral terms 2005-2008 and 2009-
2012. Sample includes only the party of the winning mayoral candidate and the coalition of the runner-up candidate. Panel
A reports RDD estimates following equation (E.3), fitting a 2nd order polynomial on MV in both sides of the threshold
MV = 0. Panel B and C present local linear regression estimates, based on equation (E.4) and considering alternative
bandwidths with margin of victory in the intervals [-0.025;+0.025], and [-0.010;+0.010], respectively. Winner party is a
dummy variable that equals one for the party of the winning mayoral candidate and zero for the party of the runner-up
candidate. Mean dep. var - runner-up party is the mean of the dependent variable for party members of the party of the
runner-up candidate (without taking logs). All regressions include term, municipality, and party-term fixed effects. *, **
and *** denote significance at ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the
municipality level.
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Table A.9: Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members in the Municipal Public Sector -
Party Membership Constant Over the Mayoral Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Party members employed
in the private sector
Total party members hired
in the private sector Separation
rate (annual
avg.)Log
Share of total
private sector
employees
Log
Share of total
private sector
hires
Panel A: RDD estimates using a second order spline polynomial specification
Winner coalition 0.275*** 0.018*** 0.531*** 0.027*** 0.016***
(0.017) (0.001) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 21,272 21,272 21,272 21,272 20,900
No. municipalities 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,497
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up party 42.4 0.062 17.1 0.033 0.085
Panel B: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.025;+0.025]
Winner coalition 0.232*** 0.016*** 0.491*** 0.024*** 0.019***
(0.052) (0.004) (0.047) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 2,694 2,694 2,694 2,694 2,660
No. municipalities 1,259 1,259 1,259 1,259 1,244
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up party 39.5 0.067 2.2 0.036 0.088
Panel C: RDD estimates for local linear regression with observation in interval [-0.010;+0.010]
Winner coalition 0.262*** 0.015** 0.550*** 0.026*** 0.021***
(0.087) (0.007) (0.078) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,058
No. municipalities 523 523 523 523 517
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up party 38.7 0.067 2.2 0.035 0.088
Notes. This table analyzes the effect of winning a mayoral election on other measures of employment of party members in
the municipal private sector, considering individuals’ party membership in the electoral year and maintaining it constant for
the whole mayoral term to avoid capturing changes in party membership that occurred following the elections. Observations
are at the municipality, electoral coalition, and term level. Sample includes mayoral terms 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. Sample
includes only the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and the coalition of the runner-up candidate. Individuals are
classified as party members based on their political party membership in the electoral year (i.e., we do not consider any
changes in party membership that may have occurred following the elections). Panel A reports RDD estimates following
equation (E.3), fitting a 2nd order polynomial on MV in both sides of the threshold MV = 0. Panel B and C present local
linear regression estimates, based on equation (E.4) and considering alternative bandwidths with margin of victory in the
intervals [-0.025;+0.025], and [-0.010;+0.010], respectively. Winner party is a dummy variable that equals one for the party
of the winning mayoral candidate and zero for the coalition of the runner-up candidate. Mean dep. var - runner-up party
is the mean of the dependent variable for party members of the party of the runner-up candidate (without taking logs). All
regressions include term, municipality, and party-term fixed effects. *, ** and *** denote significance at ten, five, and one
percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the municipality level.
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Table A.10: Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members in the Municipal Public Sector
- Senior Officials and Managers - New Hires and Promotions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Senior officials and managers
All
Senior public
administration
officials
All
Senior public
administration
officials
Hires Promotions
Panel A: Party members employed in municipality by job category (in logs)
Winner coalition 0.543*** 0.429*** 0.365*** 0.303***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Observations 21,272 21,272 21,272 21,272
Municipalities 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532
Mean dep. var.
runner-up 2.3 1.8 1.6 1.3
Panel B: Party members employed in municipality by job category (share of job category)
Winner coalition 0.091*** 0.093*** 0.057*** 0.066***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 20,624 19,660 20,624 19,660
Municipalities 5,451 5,314 5,451 5,314
Mean dep. var.
runner-up 2.380 1.991 1.693 1.388
Notes. This table analyzes promotions and hirings of the party members into senior positions in the municipal public sector.
Observations are at the municipality, coalition, and year level. Sample includes only the coalition of the winning mayoral
candidate and the coalition of the runner-up candidate. Sample includes mayoral terms 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. This
table reports RDD estimates following equation (E.3), fitting a 2nd order polynomial in MV in both sides of the threshold
MV = 0. All regressions include municipality, term, and party-term fixed effects. The dependent variable in Panel A is
(the log of one plus) the total number of members of the winning or runner-up coalitions that are promoted or hired into
senior positions in the municipal public sector over the whole mayoral term. The dependent variable in Panel B is the
number of promotions or hires of members of the winner/runner-up coalitions over the whole mayoral term scaled by the
average number of workers in each occupational category. Columns (1) and (2) display results for hires, and columns (3)
and (4) display results for promotions. Columns (1) and (4) show results considering all senior officials and managers, while
columns (2) and (4) focus on the top senior officials in the municipal government. Winner coalition is a dummy variable
that equals one for the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and zero for the coalition of the runner-up candidate.
Mean dep. var - runner-up coal. before term is the mean of the dependent variable for party members of the coalition of
the runner-up candidate in the years before the mayoral term (without taking logs). *, ** and *** denote significance at
ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the municipality level.
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Table A.11: Effect of Winning Office on Wages of Party Members in the Public Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Senior officials and managers
Professionals
Mid-level
technicians
Clerks
Blue collar
workersAll
Senior public
administration
officials
Panel A: Wage (log)
Winner coalition 0.197*** 0.213*** 0.096*** 0.055*** 0.073*** 0.035***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 13,250 9,890 17,154 16,748 20,050 17,498
No. municipalities 4,143 3,247 4,898 4,815 5,364 4,969
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up coalition 1,492 1,596 1,486 967.0 789.7 906.2
Panel B: Wage residual
Winner coalition 0.132*** 0.145*** 0.070*** 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.026***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 13,066 9,720 17,004 16,550 19,990 17,144
No. municipalities 4,109 3,205 4,870 4,781 5,360 4,902
Mean dep. var.
- runner-up coalition 0.214 0.232 0.062 0.010 -0.072 0.032
Notes. This table analyzes the effect of winning a mayoral election on the wages of party members hired by the municipal
public sector. Observations are at the municipality, coalition, and term level. Sample includes mayoral terms 2005-2008
and 2009-2012. Sample includes only the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and the coalition of the runner-up
candidate. Panel A shows results using the log of wage in the public sector as dependent variable. Panel B shows results
using the wage residuals in the public sector. Winner coalition is a dummy variable that equals one for the coalition of
the winning mayoral candidate and zero for the coalition of the runner-up candidate. Mean dep. var - runner-up coalition
is the mean of the dependent variable for party members of the coalition of the runner-up candidate (without taking logs).
All regressions include term, municipality, and party-term fixed effects. *, ** and *** denote significance at ten, five, and
one percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the municipality level.
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Table A.12: Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members in the Municipal Administration -
RDD Diff-in-Diff estimates - Occupational Categories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Senior officials and managers
Professionals
Mid-level
technicians
Clerks
Blue collar
workersAll
Senior managers
and directors
Panel A: Party members employed in municipality by job category (in logs)
Winner coalition × Year 1 0.573*** 0.452*** 0.140*** 0.101*** 0.201*** 0.110***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Winner coalition × Year 2 0.642*** 0.508*** 0.177*** 0.141*** 0.258*** 0.160***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Winner coalition × Year 3 0.620*** 0.480*** 0.193*** 0.155*** 0.258*** 0.174***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Winner coalition × Year 4 0.642*** 0.504*** 0.233*** 0.218*** 0.313*** 0.248***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Observation 148,264 148,264 148,264 148,264 148,264 148,264
No. municipalities 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532
Mean dep. var. runner-up before term 3.7 2.8 6.8 5.7 17.7 6.2
Panel B: Party members employed in municipality by job category (share oj job category)
Winner coalition × Year 1 0.118*** 0.125*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Winner coalition × Year 2 0.124*** 0.131*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.024*** 0.027***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Winner coalition × Year 3 0.115*** 0.119*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.044***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Winner coalition × Year 4 0.115*** 0.119*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.044***
(0.005 (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Observation 134,380 120,278 144,782 142,904 147,672 141,090
No. municipalities 5,479 5,379 5,528 5,519 5,531 5,502
Mean dep. var. runner-up before term 0.097 0.098 0.048 0.063 0.076 0.111
Notes. This table reports results of RDD estimates following equation (E.5), fitting a 2nd order polynomial in MV in both sides of the threshold MV = 0. All regressions include term-period,
municipality, and party-term fixed effects. The dependent variable is the number of party members belonging to the winner or runner-up coalition divided by the total number of municipal
public sector in that occupation. Observations are at the municipality, coalition, and year level. Sample includes only the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and the coalition of the
runner-up candidate. Sample includes mayoral terms 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. For each mayoral term, we use seven annual observations, including three years before the beginning of the term
and the four years of the term. Winner coalition is a dummy variable that equals one for the coalition of the winning mayoral candidate and zero for the coalition of the runner-up candidate.
Winner coalition x Y ear t = (1, 2, 3, 4) are interactions between the dummy variable Winner coalition and different dummy variable for each of the mayoral term. Mean dep. var - runner-up
coal. before term is the mean of the dependent variable for party members of the coalition of the runner-up candidate in the years before the mayoral term (without taking logs). *, ** and ***
denote significance at ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the municipality level.
13
To the Victor Belongs the Spoils? Party
Membership and Public Sector Employment in
Brazil
Online Appendix B
Our main empirical approach exploits the fact that, differently from other settings, we can
observe outcomes both for members of the winning party and for members of the runner-up
party in a given municipality and mayoral term. This allows us to conduct an RDD in close
races within municipality, comparing outcomes between parties and abstracting from any
differences across municipalities. As an alternative approach, this Online Appendix presents
results using an RDD in close races across municipalities, which is similar to standard re-
gression discontinuity designs in the literature. In particular, for a given party, we compare
the public sector employment of its members in municipalities where the party barely won
an election with municipalities where the party barely lost an election. The intuition for this
empirical strategy is that municipalities where a given party lost an election by a narrow
margin can be a good counterfactual for municipalities where the same party won an election
by a narrow margin. We view this approach as complementary to our main empirical ap-
proach, and it can provide additional information, by highlighting differences across parties
in the extent to which they favour their party members in hiring.
To implement our RDD approach we estimate the following regression separately for
different political parties.1
τpmj =
q∑
k=0
ρkMV
k
pmj +Winnerpmj
q∑
k=0
δkMV
k
pmj + αj + εpmj (E.B.1)
where τpmj is a measure of the public sector employment of members of party p, in munic-
ipality m, in term j. Winnerpmj is a dummy that equals one if party p won the elections
and is in power in municipality m and mayoral term j, and zero otherwise (i.e., for those
municipalities where party p was the runner-up). αj are term fixed effects. The sample is
1We also conducted these analyses using a local linear regression considering alternative bandwidths (5%,
2.5%, and 1%) and obtained similar results.
1
restricted to those municipalities where party m either won the mayoral elections or was the
runner-up. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Different from equation
(??) in the main text of the paper, we do not include political party-term fixed effects, since
we estimate separate regressions for each party. We also don’t include municipality fixed
effects, as many municipalities only enter our sample once.2
Appendix Table B.1 presents the results of our RDD estimates of (E.B.1) for all the
measures of employment in the municipal public sector that we study in Tables 3 and 4.
3 We estimate separate sets of regressions for the party that was in power at the national
level, namely Partido dos Trabalhadores (Panel A) and the three largest parties in terms
of mayoral elections won during our sample period: Partido do Movimento Democrático
Brasileiro (Panel B); Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Panel C); and Democratas
(Panel D).
The results reported in Appendix Table B.1 show that considering an RDD in close races
across municipalities, within a given party, yields similar results as our main approach. In
particular, the results in columns (1) and (2) show that the number of members of a given
party working in the municipal public sector is higher in municipalities where the party won a
close election than in municipalities where it lost a close election, both in absolute terms and
as a fraction of total municipal workers. Moreover, the results in columns (3) and (4) show
that winning a mayoral election has a positive and significant effect on the hiring of party
members in the municipal public sector. We do not find any qualitative differences across
parties, as all parties increase the hiring of their party members when they win the mayoral
elections. In terms of magnitude, the results suggest that the Partido dos Trabalhadores
and the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro tend to engage in more discretionary
hiring of their party members than the other parties.
The RDD in close races across municipalities, within party, controls for time-invariant and
time-varying differences between municipalities where a given party won a close election and
municipalities where it lost a close election. Therefore, we should not expect any differences
between treatment and control groups around the cutoff MVpmj = 0. Appendix Table B.2
reports the results of balance checks for several municipality characteristics, as well as mayoral
candidate characteristics. The results show that that there is no discontinuity around the
cutoff MVpmj = 0.
2We obtain similar results if we include municipality fixed effects, although this implies focusing only on
municipalities where a given party was either the winner or the runner-up in both the 2004 and the 2008
mayoral elections.
3Similarly to Tables 3 and 4, we aggregate outcomes for members of all parties belonging to the winning
or runner-up coalitions.
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Table B.1: Effect of Winning Office on Employment of Party Members in the Municipal Public Sector -
RDD across Municipalities by Political Party
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Party members employed
in the municipal public sector
Total party members hired
over the whole term Separation rate
(annual avg.)
Log
Share of total
municipal
employees
Log
Share of total
municipal
hires
Panel A: Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)
PT winner 0.427*** 0.028*** 0.766*** 0.033*** 0.018***
(0.108) (0.004) (0.107) (0.003) (0.006)
Observations 1,938 1,938 1,938 1,938 1,880
No. municipalities 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,389
Mean dep. var.
- PT runner-up 52.4 0.039 24.8 0.023 0.091
Panel B: Partido do Movimento Democra´tico Brasileiro (PMDB)
PMDB winner 0.406*** 0.029*** 0.627*** 0.035*** 0.013***
(0.059) (0.004) (0.067) (0.002) (0.004)
Observations 4,261 4,261 4,261 4,261 4,190
No. municipalities 3,035 3,035 3,035 3,035 3,005
Mean dep. var.
- PMDB runner-up 44.3 0.069 17.5 0.035 0.094
Panel C: Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB)
PSDB winner 0.284*** 0.026*** 0.529*** 0.031*** 0.008
(0.073) (0.004) (0.079) (0.003) (0.005)
Observations 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,392
No. municipalities 1,888 1,888 1,888 1,888 1,869
Mean dep. var.
- PSDB runner-up 40.6 0.069 15.5 0.037 0.094
Panel D: Democratas (DEM)
DEM winner 0.232*** 0.020*** 0.445*** 0.026*** 0.011**
(0.068) (0.004) (0.076) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 2,984 2,984 2,984 2,984 2,955
No. municipalities 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,184
Mean dep. var.
- DEM runner-up 49.5 0.067 20.0 0.035 0.093
Notes. This table analyzes the effect of winning a mayoral election on employment of party members in the municipal public
sector. Observations are at the municipality and term level. Sample includes mayoral terms 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. Each
panel considers a different political party and the sample includes only municipalities where the party won the mayoral
election or was the runner up. The table reports results of RDD estimates following equation (E.6), fitting a 2nd order
polynomial on MV in both sides of the threshold MV = 0. All regressions include term and municipality fixed effects.
”Party” winner is a dummy variable that equals one in municipalities where the party coalition won the mayoral elections
and zero in municipalities where the party coalition is the runner-up. Mean dep. var - “party” runner-up is the mean of
the dependent variable in the municipality where the party was the runner-up (without taking logs). *, ** and *** denote
significance at ten, five, and one percent level, respectively.
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Table B.2: Balance Checks for Municipal and Mayoral Characteristics - RDD across Municipalities by Political Party
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Population Area Income Urbanization Sewer Eletricity Age College Incumbent
Panel A: Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)
PT winner -0.147 0.028 -0.102* -0.030 0.004 -0.020 0.333 -0.056 -0.006
(0.102) (0.107) (0.053) (0.021) (0.025) (0.015) (0.723) (0.042) (0.033)
Observations 1,938 1,938 1,938 1,938 1,938 1,938 1,938 1,938 1,938
No. Municipalities 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423
Panel B: Partido do Movimento Democra´tico Brasileiro (PMDB)
PMDB winner 0.006 0.014 0.020 0.010 0.003 -0.004 1.289 0.000 -0.026
(0.061) (0.073) (0.036) (0.013) (0.015) (0.009) (1.630) (0.028) (0.024)
Observations 4,261 4,261 4,261 4,261 4,261 4,261 4,261 4,261 4,261
No. Municipalities 3,035 3,035 3,035 3,035 3,035 3,035 3,035 3,035 3,035
Panel C: Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB)
PSDB winner -0.020 -0.088 -0.053 -0.024 -0.043* 0.007 0.573 0.031 -0.017
(0.079) (0.093) (0.047) (0.017) (0.022) (0.013) (0.755) (0.036) (0.031)
Observations 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420
No. Municipalities 1,888 1,888 1,888 1,888 1,888 1,888 1,888 1,888 1,888
Panel D: Democratas (DEM)
DEM winner -0.010 0.027 0.002 0.009 -0.007 0.001 -0.187 0.010 -0.022
(0.075) (0.085) (0.042) (0.015) (0.020) (0.010) (0.689) (0.034) (0.029)
Observations 2,984 2,984 2,984 2,984 2,984 2,984 2,984 2,984 2,984
No. Municipalities 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202
Notes. This table reports balance checks for municipal and mayoral candidate characteristics. Observations are at municipality and party level. Sample includes. Each panel considers
a different political party. “Party” winner is a dummy variable that equals one for the municipalities where the party coalition won the mayoral elections and zero in municipalities
where the party coalition is the runner-up. *, ** and *** denote significance at ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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